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This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters. The first two chapters are
concerned with the same overall topic though, namely exchange rate determination
in Emerging Economies (EMEs), while the third chapter is related to the dynamics
of capital flows in EMEs.
The first chapter studies the impact of monetary policy announcements on the
exchange rate behaviour in EMEs under Inflation Targeting (IT), focusing on the
case of Colombia, Chile and Brazil. I address two specific issues. First, I analyze
if the pattern of exchange rate returns and its volatility behave diﬀerently on days
when the Central Bank makes interest rate announcements. Second, I investigate
whether the adoption of IT has produced a systematic change in the eﬀect of these
announcements on the exchange rate. Using daily data, the results provide evidence
that there are significant diﬀerences in the conditional volatility of exchange rate
returns on days when interest rate announcements surprise the market. The results
indicate that the eﬀects of surprise announcements on the exchange rate volatility
have been diminished due to the adoption of IT and is related to the systematic
change in market expectations.
The second chapter studies the eﬀectiveness of foreign exchange intervention in
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. I use the coordination channel approach
of exchange rate behaviour where exchange rates are determined in an environment
of order flow from informed and uninformed traders. The empirical approach of this
theoretical model is based on a Smooth Transition Regression GARCH-M (STR-
GARCH-M) model where the confidence of traders in the fundamentals depends on
exchange rate misalignments and central bank intervention that increases traders’
confidence and strengthen the degree of exchange rate mean reversion. Unlike the
existent literature on this channel of intervention, I include a measure of risk premium
in the conditional mean equation of exchange rate returns that is consistent with the
idea that the rejection of the risk-neutral eﬃcient market hypothesis may be the
xii
result of a time-varying risk premia. Using daily data from 2000 to 2013, the results
suggest that foreign exchange intervention has been eﬀective via the coordination
channel, and the risk premia decreases the pace of depreciation as risk averse investors
demand a higher rate of return from holding the domestic currency.
The recent literature on capital flows has tried to find evidence regarding the
post-crisis increase of capital inflows in EMEs due to Fed Unconventional Monetary
Policies (UMP). In the third chapter, I address this open question analyzing if the
eﬀect of these policies on capital flows in EMEs depends on the degree of financial
exposure of each country to the US. This approach could be the smoking gun in this
debate as I attempt to find evidence of a specific mechanism by which these policies
could aﬀect the pattern of capital flows. I estimate a dynamic panel data model
with country fixed eﬀects using quarterly data on gross private capital inflows for 46
EMEs from 2000:Q1 to 2013:Q2. The results suggest that UMP have a significant
eﬀect on capital flows that depends on the type of unconventional measure examined
and it is bigger if countries have a higher financial exposure to the US.
xiii
Chapter 1





During the last two decades, Central Banks in some developing and developed coun-
tries have implemented Inflation Targeting (IT) as a framework for monetary policy
in order to control inflation. In 1990, New Zealand was the first country that adopted
this regime followed by Canada and United Kingdom. As Roger (2010) notes, today
there are 26 countries using IT and about half are developing countries. The prin-
cipal goal of monetary policy in countries under IT is price stability. However, in
some emerging countries such as Colombia, Chile and Brazil, the monitoring of the
exchange rate behaviour and the implementation of intervention policies with the
purpose of defending the exchange rate remain important in Central Bank policies,
1
as the external situation of each country aﬀects directly monetary conditions.
This paper studies the pattern of exchange rate returns and its volatility on Cen-
tral Bank meeting days when interest rates are announced to the public. The aim
is to investigate the role of the information incorporated in interest rate announce-
ments and its impact on the exchange rate behaviour before and after the adoption
of IT. The hypothesis is that the pattern of transmission of surprise interest rate
announcements on the exchange rate dynamics has changed after the adoption of
IT, and is related to the systematic change in market expectations.
If after the adoption of IT, surprise announcements are not powerful in explaining
the exchange rate returns and its volatility on Central Bank meeting days, there are
two possible explanations. There are less surprises in the market due to the adoption
of IT or there is a greater range of acceptable surprises which reduces the impact of
surprise announcements on the exchange rate dynamics. Although less surprises in
the market could be related to the degree of transparency or credibility of Central
Banks, this paper only focuses on IT eﬀects and cannot isolate the exact channel
which drives this result.
The adoption of IT could change the mechanisms through which the information
incorporated into interest announcements aﬀects agents expectations. The role of
this information is associated with the degree of independence, transparency and
credibility of Central Banks; therefore it is necessary to study the exchange rate dy-
namics from a microeconomic perspective, analyzing the relationship between agents
in the foreign exchange market rather than the determinants of the exchange rate
under conventional macroeconomic models. This is one of the main contributions
of this paper to the recent literature of exchange rate determination in Emerging
Economies (EMEs) and it contrasts with the traditional macroeconomic approach
used in these countries.1
1The debate between monetary authorities in developing economies has been focused on studying
the determinants of the exchange rate from a macroeconomic perspective. For instance, the litera-
2
This paper is an extension of similar studies developed in industrialized economies
(Melvin et al. 2004 and 2010) to emerging countries focusing on the case of Colombia,
Chile and Brazil. They analyze the pattern of the exchange rate on Monetary Policy
Committee days in the UK using the traditional event-study framework but explicitly
modelling the conditional variance as time-varying. They find a notable change in
exchange rate volatility on days when the interest rate announcement is a surprise.
However, they do not analyze if the adoption of IT has changed the mechanisms of
transmission of interest rate announcements on exchange rate behaviour, especially
if they surprise the market. This analysis is developed in this paper and is another
contribution to the literature on exchange rate determination in developing countries.
After studying exchange rate arrangements (Reinhart and Rogoﬀ 2002) and the
date of adoption of IT across countries (Roger 2010), there are two reasons for
selecting Colombia, Chile and Brazil in this paper. First, they adopted IT in 1999
under similar economic conditions. Second, there is a high degree of association
between their foreign exchange markets. In order to assess the eﬀects of interest
rate announcements on the exchange rate dynamics, I use daily data that covers
two periods. First, the pre-IT scheme from 1995 in Colombia and Chile, and from
1996 in Brazil to the date of adoption of IT in each country in 1999. Secondly, the
IT regime running from its adoption date to December 2011. The main reason to
start the pre-IT scheme analysis in 1995 is that between 1995 and 1996, Colombia,
Chile and Brazil implemented new monetary mechanisms in order to reduce the
interbank interest rate volatility, and in 2000 all of them were under a managed
floating exchange rate regime and an IT monetary framework.
ture in EMEs has specialized in analyzing the exchange rate dynamics under conventional models,
Taylor rule models, and the New Open Macroeconomics. This research is purely a microstructural
approach of exchange rate determination. As Sarno and Taylor (2002) note, the microstructural
approach does not suppose that there is homogeneity between foreign exchange market agents and
assumes that public and non public information are relevant to exchange rates. In addition, the
microstructural approach analyses the mechanism of foreign exchange trading instead of imposing
diﬀerent macroeconomic relationships such as the purchasing power parity and a particular money
demand function (Ibid).
3
As in Melvin et al. (2004), I test the equality of means and variances on daily ex-
change rate returns to assess if there are diﬀerences between days when the Board of
Directors (BOD) announces its policy rate decision and the other days. In addition,
GARCH eﬀects are modelled in order to test if on BOD meeting days and after the
adoption of IT, there are significant diﬀerences in nominal exchange rate volatility
when policy rate announcements surprise the market. Finally, a Logit model is used
to examine the role of surprise announcements and inflation targeting in explaining
extreme exchange returns. The tests of equality of means and variances do not re-
port any diﬀerences between the BOD meeting days and other days in Colombia,
Chile, and Brazil either before or after the adoption of IT. EGARCH models pro-
vide evidence of significant diﬀerences in exchange rate volatility on interest rate
announcement days, especially when they surprise the market. The results indicate
that the eﬀects of surprise announcements on exchange rate volatility have been di-
minished due to the adoption of IT and is related to the systematic change in market
expectations.
The next section reviews the literature about exchange rate determination and
how this paper relates to the existing literature. Section 1.3 discusses the current
monetary and exchange rate policies and their objectives in Colombia, Chile, and
Brazil. Section 1.4 describes the data set and the empirical methodology. Section 1.5
discusses the empirical results. Section 1.6 covers the conclusions, policy implications
and future research.
1.2 Exchange Rate Determination: Related Litera-
ture
There are two diﬀerent approaches to study the exchange rate behaviour. The
macroeconomic approach based on fundamental relationships, and the microstruc-
4
tural approach which analyses the impact of the information contained in macroe-
conomic announcements on the exchange rate.
In Colombia, Chile and Brazil there is some literature analyzing the determinants
of the exchange rate under a macroeconomic perspective. These studies focus on long
term relationships between the exchange rate and its fundamentals. For instance,
Gamboa (2011) uses conventional and Taylor rule models for Colombia and finds
that the Flexible Price Monetary Model outperforms the random walk model of
the exchange rate in forecasting at long horizons. In Chile, Calderón (2004) finds a
cointegration relationship between the exchange rate and its fundamentals. In Brazil,
Moura et al. (2008) find that Behavioral Equilibrium Models and Taylor Rule models
have superior forecasting performance in contrast with the random walk benchmark.
There is no extensive literature in these countries studying the exchange rate
from a microeconomic approach. However, it is important to note the most relevant
studies. In Colombia, Kamil (2008) finds evidence that exchange rate intervention
is ineﬀective when is incompatible with the main objective of the Central Bank, the
achievement of the inflation target. Toro and Julio (2005) study the eﬀectiveness of
exchange rate intervention using ten-minutes return data. They note that exchange
rate intervention is only eﬀective if is credible and the amount of intervention is
significant. Toro and Rincon (2010) evaluate the eﬀectiveness of intervention and
capital controls for depreciating the exchange rate and reducing its volatility. Using
high frequency data and a GARCH model for the exchange rate, they find that
exchange rate intervention and capital controls increased exchange rate volatility.
Similarly, in Chile some studies have been focused on the eﬀectiveness of the oﬃcial
intervention using daily and intraday analysis. For instance, Tapia and Tokman
(2004) note the importance of the credibility of intervention policy announcements
to impact the pattern of the exchange rate.
Zettelmeyer (2003), Goncalves and Guimaraes (2007) and Kohlscheen (2011) are
5
the closest studies to this paper. For instance, Zettelmeyer (2003) analyses the im-
pact of monetary policy on the foreign exchange market in Chile. He uses an event
study approach covering only four years after the adoption of a floating exchange
rate regime. He finds that the reaction of the bilateral exchange rate to monetary
policy decisions adopted in Chile is lower than the response found to the monetary
policy in the US. Goncalves and Guimaraes (2007) analyze the impact of monetary
policy decisions on the exchange rate in Brazil from 2000 to 2006. They examine the
direct eﬀect of 1-year interest rate changes on exchange rate returns around Central
Bank meeting days and find that unexpected increases in Brazilian policy rates tend
to depreciate the domestic currency. Kohlscheen (2011) employs an event study to
analyze the impact of monetary policy shocks on bilateral exchange rates in Chile,
Brazil and Mexico. He finds a lack of evidence of the uncovered interest parity in
these economies that makes it necessary to understand other factors such as global
risk aversion and the dynamics of international capital flows. All these studies an-
alyze the relationship between exchange rates and policy rates under the standard
uncovered interest parity condition with rational expectations. One of the main dif-
ferences of my approach is to consider that the conditional variance of exchange rate
returns is time-varying, and although I focus on monetary policy meeting days, I
use all daily observations of exchange rate returns to model GARCH eﬀects. Addi-
tionally, I analyze if the transmission mechanisms of unanticipated monetary policy
decisions on the exchange rate behaviour have changed after the adoption of IT. This
has important policy implications and makes a notable contribution to the exchange
rate literature in EMEs.
The literature analyzing the impact of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates
in developed countries is extensive. For instance, Faust et al. (2003) use high
frequency data and employ a SVAR to identify the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks
on variables such as the foreign interest rate and the exchange rate. The main
6
conclusion is the significant eﬀect of U.S. monetary shocks on the exchange rate
using an intraday analysis. Furthermore, they find that large uncovered interest
parity deviations are generated for this type of shocks in the economy. Andersen
et al. (2003) use data consisting of macroeconomics expectations, macroeconomics
announcements and real time quotations of exchange rates. Their main conclusion is
that news, especially surprising announcements aﬀect the conditional mean of U.S.
dollar spot exchange rates. Thus, the exchange rate dynamics are linked to the
announcement timing and the market reaction to news called the sign eﬀects, which
is the recognition that good news has less impact than bad news.
Kuttner (2001) studies the impact of monetary policy on asset prices. He uses a
decomposition of the Federal funds rate into anticipated and unanticipated compo-
nents, finding a significant eﬀect of unanticipated changes in the policy rate on bond
rates. Zettelmeyer (2004) evaluates the impact of monetary policy shocks on the
exchange rate for three similar countries, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The
study is developed during the 1990s. At that time all of them had common charac-
teristics such as high degree of openness, the use of inflation targeting frameworks
and floating exchange regimes. The main result is that the mechanisms of trans-
mission between monetary policy and exchange rates go according to the economic
theory. For instance, estimations for these countries suggest an appreciation of the
exchange rate by 2-3 percent when there is an increase in the short interest rates by
1 percent. In addition, they find that changes in monetary policy in order to reduce
the turbulence in the foreign exchange rate are not eﬀective if these decisions are
taken on the same day that the exchange rate volatility is greater than in average.
Melvin et al. (2004 and 2010) examine the Dollar-sterling foreign exchange mar-
ket pattern around the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) days of the Bank of
England. They evaluate if surprise interest rate announcements days contain impor-
tant information that changes the dynamic of the exchange rate. They perform a
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daily and intraday analysis. In the daily analysis they find that announcement days
have more exchange rate volatility than all other days. Finally, the intraday analysis
is based on a Markov switching model. The evidence shows that the probability of
remaining in the high volatility state or in the low volatility state diﬀers around the
announcement time and that prior to the announcements there is limited evidence
of market positioning.
This paper relies on the literature developed in industrialized countries, mainly
on Melvin et al. (2004 and 2010), and confirms their empirical findings that there
is useful information on announcement days that produce significant diﬀerences in
exchange rate volatility, especially if those announcements are unexpected. This
paper combines the event study framework with a conditional time-varying variance
where the signaling channel of interest rate announcements is important in explaining
the exchange rate behaviour.
1.3 Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Policy in
Colombia, Chile, and Brazil
Colombia, Chile and Brazil implemented IT as a monetary framework and a flexible
exchange rate scheme at the end of the 1990s. These events were motivated by the
economic slowdown in 1999 associated partially to the international economic crisis
and the unsustainable fixed exchange rate system.
Figure 1.1 shows the exchange rate dynamics in these countries. The higher de-
gree of association between their foreign exchange markets reflected in the exchange
rate dynamics before and after the adoption of IT is evident. This is the main rea-
son to study these countries in order to find if they have any similar pattern in the
transmission of monetary policy shocks on exchange rate returns and its volatility.
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Figure 1.1: Nominal Exchange Rates in Colombia, Chile and Brazil
1.3.1 The case of Colombia
The main objective of monetary policy in Colombia since 1991 has been the grad-
ual reduction in inflation. M1 as the most narrowly measure of the money supply
was initially used as the intermediate target of the monetary regime. However, the
monetary base was chosen as intermediate target in 1996 as it was more accurate
in predicting the price level dynamics. Monetary policy was conducted within the
framework of an hybrid between monetary and exchange rate anchor as Colombia
adopted a crawling band system around the dollar on January 24 1994 (Figure A.1).
The Central Bank intervened more actively in the foreign exchange market when the
exchange rate approached the upper and lower limits of the band and there were four
realignments since its adoption. As Bernal (2003) notes, the monetary authority had
the opportunity to make independent movements in the policy rate when the nominal
exchange rate was not precisely at either limit of the band. In addition, the crawling
band system was a framework between a fixed exchange rate system and a floating
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exchange rate regime that according to Villar (1998) was sending clear messages to
the market about the equilibrium exchange rate level in the medium and long-run.
This scheme was trying to avoid excessive fluctuations of the exchange rate that were
compromising the inflation objective. According to Vargas (2005), the abandonment
of the exchange rate band on September 25 1999 was mainly caused by the terms of
trade shocks and the sudden stop of 1998-99 originated in the Russian crisis (1998)
in an scenario of large external imbalances, a declining GDP growth and a domestic
banking crisis.
After the adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime, Colombia converged to a
completely IT framework despite the diﬃcult economic situation that was experienc-
ing. The primary objective of monetary policy under IT in Colombia is to achieve
and maintain a stable and low inflation rate and reach a long run GDP growth
trend. At the end of each year, the Board of Directors (BOD) sets quantitative
inflation targets defined as the annual variation of the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
The monetary policy is implemented by changing interest rates with the purpose
of withdraw or provide liquidity to the economy. These interventions rates are the
monetary policy tool and through them the other interest rates are aﬀected in the
economy.
Figure 1.2 describes the dynamic of inflation relative to the target and the pattern
of inflation expectations since the adoption of IT. There is evidence that inflation
was close to the target at the beginning of the IT period, specifically in 2001, 2002,
2005 and 2006. In addition, inflation was above the target in 2003, 2007 and 2008
and below the target in 2009 and 2010. The central bank describes in the quarterly
inflation report the possible factors that account for failure to achieve the inflation
target. Supply shocks such as climate change, a stronger demand or changes in
inflation expectations could be the main causes of failure to meet the inflation target.
For instance, food inflation attributable in part to weather conditions, strong demand
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from Venezuela and increasing world commodity prices were the main causes of
failure to meet the inflation target in 2007. Although there is no information of
inflation expectations since the beginning of the IT period, inflationary expectations
adjusted quickly to this new monetary regime.
Figure 1.2: Observed Inflation, Targets and Expectations in Colombia
Every month the BOD meets to set the interest rate. These decisions are based
on the extensive monthly briefing on the economy received from the Banco de la
República Staﬀ. There are three important meeting days after the adoption of IT.
In the first day, which usually takes place four working days before the interest
rate announcement meeting, the BOD revises the Inflation Report. That document
evaluates the evolution of variables such as the consumer and producer price indexes,
measures related to basic inflation, production and costs indicators, price series on
money, credit, interest rates, asset prices and international economic indicators. In
addition, the medium and long-run prospects of inflation are analyzed. Although
the Inflation Report is only made public quarterly, the brief review of the economy
previous to the announcement day is fundamental in the final decision made by the
BOD.
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Based on this report, there is a second meeting day which usually takes place
two working days before the BOD interest rate setting meeting. During this day, the
Banco de la República Staﬀ makes policy recommendations and analyses the main
conclusions that resulted from the first meeting. Based on these policy recommenda-
tions, during the third day, the Board sets its position about the policy interest rate
for the next month. These meetings are usually held on Friday on the third week of
each month at predetermined dates. The information analyzed during the first two
meeting days is not public before the announcement day, and the final decision is
released to the public on the third day at no specific time. Before the adoption of IT,
between 1995 and 1999, there was a brief report on the economy analyzed before the
announcement day. However, this report was not public, and therefore the interest
rate decision day is the only day included in this analysis.
There is a strong link between monetary and exchange rate policies in Colombia.
The IT regime was implemented under a flexible exchange rate framework. This ex-
change rate scheme classified as managed floating according to Reinhart and Rogoﬀ
(2002) is governed by intervention rules. Its main objective is to limit the exchange
rate volatility and maintain an optimal level of international reserves in order to
reduce the vulnerability to external shocks. The Banco de la República has diﬀer-
ent intervention mechanisms in the foreign exchange market. It can intervene in
the foreign exchange market through option auctions, selling or purchasing foreign
exchange directly at its own discretion, and purchasing foreign exchange through
competitive auctions in the foreign exchange market.
According to the IT regime, there should be consistency between monetary policy
and exchange rate policy. However, given the importance that the Banco de la
República gives to the exchange rate reflected in its constant monitoring and the
use of intervention tools, there is risk of inconsistency. This is the concern of the
last years reflected in some working papers such as Kamil (2008) that finds oﬃcial
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intervention ineﬀective in the first half of 2007 which resulted in the conflict between
diminishing the appreciation and achieving the inflation target.
1.3.2 The case of Chile
Chile was the first country in Latin America that adopted IT as monetary frame-
work. The transition to this monetary regime was developed in two stages. During
the 1990s, the Central Bank of Chile set inflation targets and used diﬀerent instru-
ments such as interest rates to control inflation levels. In addition, the development
of monetary policy was conditioned to the high degree of indexation. Unlike Colom-
bia, monetary policy did not use any monetary aggregate as intermediate target. An
exchange rate band and an annual inflation target were used as nominal anchors.
There was a permanent conflict between achieving the inflation target and main-
taining the exchange rate within the corridor, and the crawling band was defended
by intervention in the foreign exchange market (Figure A.2). Given the high degree
of indexation, real interest rates were used as the main policy tool. However, there
was an implicit nominal anchor as the real interest rate was adjusted according to
the inflation target. Although the monetary authority defined punctual or inflation
target ranges during that decade, other characteristics such as transparency and
communication were absent. After September 1 1999, IT was fully adopted along
with the adoption of a fully free floating exchange regime. However, it was not until
May 2000 that the Central Bank published the first inflation report, and thereby
improved substantially the level of transparency and credibility of the institution.
The main objective of monetary policy is to preserve price stability defined in
terms of the consumer price index (CPI) targets set each year. Monetary policy is
implemented by defining monthly targets for the interbank interest rate known as
the monetary policy rate (tasa de política monetaria TPM). Although during the
1990s there was a high degree of indexation of the Chilean Economy, the monetary
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policy rate was nominalised in August 2001. In addition, the Central Bank regulates
the liquidity of the financial system through diﬀerent instruments in order to assure
that the interbank rate falls in the target previously defined.
Figure 1.3 shows the dynamic of inflation relative to the target and the behaviour
of inflation expectations during IT. Although inflation expectations adjusted quickly
to IT, there were some periods where the central bank failed to achieve the inflation
target. For instance, in 2004 and 2009 the annual inflation was considerably lower
than the inflation target, while in 2007 and 2008 was notably above as in Colombia.
For instance, food price increases, specifically prices of perishable food, and soaring
prices of fuel and electricity were the main causes of the annual inflation acceleration
at the end of 2007 and the failure to meet the inflation target. In addition, the pattern
of international prices of some commodities such as wheat and corn by-products were
determinant in driving the domestic price behaviour.
Figure 1.3: Observed Inflation, Targets and Expectations in Chile
The TPM is determined by the Board of Directors (BOD) every month. There
are two important days in the process of interest rate setting before and after the
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fully adoption of IT. During the first day, that usually is held two working days
before the interest rate announcement day, the staﬀ from the Central Bank gives
an economic outlook to the BOD. The brief economic review is made public on
the previous day of the interest rate announcement day, and this is the basis of the
interest rate decisions. During the second day, that usually is held on Thursdays, the
Board makes the decision about the monetary policy interest rate with the posterior
publication of the resolution to the public in the evening of that day.
The current foreign exchange policy is based on a fully flexible exchange rate
regime. However, as in Colombia, this flexibility does not avoid the use of foreign
exchange intervention mechanisms in order to control the exchange rate volatility.
The Central Bank of Chile only intervenes under exceptional circumstances when
the exchange rate deviates notably from its fundamentals. These interventions are
fully transparent and announced to the public in advance along with the reasons
involved in these actions.
1.3.3 The case of Brazil
The Real Plan was introduced in 1994 to stabilize the Brazilian economy. These set
of measures brought about a continuous reduction in inflation. In 1994, the central
bank introduced quarterly targets for the monetary base, M1 and M4. Monetary
policy was more flexible after the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime in
July 1994. However, aftermath of the Mexican crisis, a crawling band system was
formally adopted on March 5 1995 (Figure A.3). The central bank intervened in
the foreign exchange market in order to maintain the exchange rate within the band
limits and preserve the stability in the market. In 1996, an interest rate corridor
was introduced and the eﬀective interest rate on federal securities transactions or
Selic rate was the operational target of monetary policy. Brazil floated its currency,
the Real, on January 18 1999. Its attempt to control deviations of the exchange
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rate through reserves accumulation has not aﬀected the functioning of the floating
exchange rate scheme, especially during the recent financial turmoil. The current
exchange rate arrangement is classified as managed floating where the central bank
buys or sell foreign currency through publicly announcements and this process is
transparent to the market. On June 21 1999, Brazil converged to a new monetary
policy system, inflation targeting. This new monetary regime was chosen in order
to try to achieve price stability considering that the economy was under a floating
exchange rate regime and there was uncertainty about the eﬀects of the Brazilian
real devaluation on inflation. After the adoption of IT, monetary policy could be
described as a rule where the central bank modifies the eﬀective Selic rate to maintain
it close to the pre-established monthly target. This target is set according to the
annual inflation target range established by the central bank. The Selic rate is known
as the primary instrument of monetary policy and is the basic rate in the economy
as is used on overnight operations in the financial sector and balances the market of
bank reserves. In addition, changes in the eﬀective Selic rate respond to one year
ahead inflation expectations that are available from the daily survey conducted by
the central bank.
The inflation target is defined in terms of the Broad National Consumer Price
Index and instead of setting punctual inflation targets, the Central Bank sets an
inflation target band in order to make the monetary policy less restrictive. The
Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM) was established in 1996. The COPOM could
set bias to its decisions in order to change the SELIC target between meetings.
There is evidence that the central bank failed to meet the inflation target during
the first four years of the adoption of IT, in part due to the economic instability
of the Brazilian economy (Figure 1.4). In 2004, 2005, 2008 and 2010, the annual
inflation rate was above the midpoint of the target range but within the upper limit
of the tolerance range, while it was below the midpoint of the target range in 2006
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and 2007. According to the Central Bank of Brazil, anchoring market expectations
is one of the main objectives of the IT regime. After the adoption of the Real Plan in
2004, monetary policy decisions become more predictable as inflation expectations
were more accurately formed and closer to the actual inflation rate as it can be
observed in Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.4: Observed Inflation, Targets and Expectations in Brazil
Between 1999 and 2000, the COPOM defined the SELIC target rate every month.
However, since 2006 the Committee meetings have been held eight times per year
and the dates are publicly announced before. There are two important meeting days
in the process of interest rate setting after the adoption of IT. In the first day, that
usually is held on Tuesdays, the Central Bank Staﬀ provides an economic outlook to
the Committee. The schedule of this meeting is made public in advance. However,
the briefing of the economy is not made public before the decision day. During the
second day, usually on Wednesdays, the COPOM makes the interest rate decision
and it is announced to the public in the evening. Before IT, the interest rate setting
process was only taken in one day.
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1.4 Empirical Methodology and the Data Set
This paper focuses on the impact of interest rate announcements on exchange rate
behaviour on monetary policy meeting days. There are diﬀerent days involved in
the interest rate setting process. Figure 1.5 shows the timeline of this process in
each country after the adoption of IT. In Chile and Brazil the interest rate decision
is released to the public after the market has closed. In Colombia, there is not a
scheduled time for the policy decision to be announced. 2However, as the mone-
tary meetings are pre-scheduled in advance after the adoption of IT, it is unlikely
that the policy decisions made by the Central Bank of Colombia respond to other
macroeconomic events on the same day. In light of these facts and as it is only on
the decision day that new information is released to the market, this paper focuses
on the day after the policy announcement is made as this is the day when markets
take into account the decision.
The information used covers two periods. First, the period before the adoption
of IT and, second the period after the adoption of this monetary regime. I consider
as the initial observation the first available data of monetary policy meetings in each
country. This date coincides with structural changes in the monetary policy strategy
as I described in the previous section. In addition, I exclude all extraordinary policy
meeting days as they could bias the results because an announcement could be
classified as a surprise when the market was not forming expectations about it.
2A couple of times, the Central Bank of Colombia has announced the policy rate in the evening
of the decision day when markets have closed. For instance, on June 15 2007, June 20 2008, and
November 23 2009 the policy rate decision was released to the public at 17:20, 20:25 and 19:22
respectively.
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Figure 1.5: Interest Rate Decision Process after the Adoption of Inflation Targeting
1.4.1 Data
The empirical analysis of the eﬀects of interest rate announcements in the foreign
exchange market uses daily data of nominal exchange rates returns against the US
Dollar in Colombia, Chile, and Brazil. This information is obtained from each Cen-
tral Bank. The exchange rate returns  et are calculated as the first diﬀerence of the
log of the nominal exchange rate against the US Dollar multiplied by 100. The daily
variation of the log exchange rate is calculated as the diﬀerence between day t + 1
and day t. The notation used for the Colombian Peso against the US Dollar is COP,
for the Chilean Peso CLP, and for the Real in Brazil BRL.
This paper examines diﬀerent aspects of the exchange rates. First, descriptive
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statistics for the level of exchange rates and their returns are reported in Tables B.1
and B.2. Table B.1 shows that the mean of the nominal exchange rate for Colombia,
Chile, and Brazil before the adoption of IT are 1238.1 COP/USD, 434.9 CLP/USD,
and 1.2 BRL/USD, respectively. Table B.2 shows that the mean for the same coun-
tries during IT are 2244.9 COP/USD, 569.9 CLP/USD, and 2.2 BRL/USD. The
standard deviation in Colombia and Chile before the adoption of IT is 277 and 35.7
respectively, considerably higher than in Brazil with a value of 0.2. The same pat-
tern is described in Table B.2 during IT. The p-value of zero from the Jarque-Bera
statistic suggests evidence of non normality for the level of exchange rates and their
returns in all countries for both periods. In addition, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
test does not reject the hypothesis of non-stationarity in the level of exchange rates
for both periods, while exchange rate returns are found to be stationary before and
after the adoption of IT.
The literature on monetary policy shocks employs diﬀerent methodologies to
estimate monetary surprises. I use the change of short-term money market rates
as a proxy for unexpected monetary decisions. As in Zettelmeyer (2004), I select
money market interest rates in each country that are short enough to reflect the
policy targets established by the monetary authorities for the short-run, and at the
same time long enough to capture any unanticipated change in the policy rate as
they are able to respond exclusively to the extent that changes in the monetary
policy rate were unexpected. 3
For Colombia and Chile, I use three month money market interest rates. The
TBS3M (Tasa Basica de la Superintendencia) in Colombia and the TIP3M (Tasa
de Interes Promedio) in Chile are calculated as the weighted average of all financial
3I use short term interest rates to construct monetary surprises due to the limited data availabil-
ity before the adoption of IT of variables such as Bloomberg survey on interest rate expectations,
yields on government securities and future rates. For instance, the Bloomberg survey is only avail-
able after 1999 for Brazil, 2001 for Chile, and 2002 for Colombia. This information clearly is not
appropriate for this paper as I want to use data that includes before and after the adoption of IT.
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institution deposit rates. This is similar to Zettelmeyer (2004) that uses three month
interest rates to estimate the unanticipated content of monetary policy actions. For
Brazil, I use the one-day interbank deposit futures contract rates (DI1) where the
underlying asset is the interest rate of interbank deposits. Brazil has a developed
futures market and according to BM&FBOVESPA, the largest stock exchange in
Brazil and one of the largest in the world, the DI1 interest rate is one of the main
benchmarks in the Brazilian interbank market. This is the main reason of selecting
this reference rate instead of three month money market rates in order to construct
accurate surprise measures. 4For instance, Kuttner (2001) and De Oliveira et. al
(2011) use data from futures markets in the US and Brazil respectively to calculate
the unanticipated component of monetary policy announcements. As De Oliveira et.
al (2011) state, markets experience changes after any unexpected monetary shock,
especially money market rates.
The actual policy rate change 4i is equal to the expected policy rate change
4ie plus the unexpected change in the policy rate 4iu. The change of the money
market interest rates selected between period t+1 and t represents a surprise or
the unexpected change in the policy rate. Why this is an appropriate measure of
continuous surprises? For Colombia, and Chile, at period t, the three month interest
rate agreed in the interbank market (t+90) includes the policy rate expectation for
the next three months, while at period t+1, the three month interest rate agreed
(t+91) incorporates the actual policy rate change. Then, if I calculate the change in
each of the three month interest rates between rt+1 = f(4ie+4iu) and rt = f(4ie),
I will get a measure of the unexpected component of the monetary announcement
or surprise f(4iu). For Brazil the change between period t+1 and t of the one-
day interbank deposit futures contract rates captures surprises because on day t
the agents in the financial system agree the rate at which they will negotiate in the
490 day swap rates in Brazil are only available from 1999.
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interbank market at day t+1. Given that the future contract is an eﬃcient instrument
for hedging against fluctuations in the average one day interbank deposit rate, this
will incorporate the expected value of the policy rate announcement 4ie. At day
t+1 the future contract rate will incorporate the actual change in the policy rate
(4ie + 4iu), and thus the diﬀerence between t+1 and t represents the monetary
surprise. It is important to note that these measures could represent changes in
expected future changes, and they still represent a surprise.
The properties of the surprise measures chosen can be described within the con-
text of the eﬃcient-markets theory that states that prices fully reflect all available
and relevant information. The main characteristic of the eﬃcient-market hypoth-
esis is the assumption of rational expectations as agents update their expectations
accordingly when new important information appears. If agents in the market use
appropriately all the available information to form their expectations, the surprise
measures chosen should be orthogonal to lagged information available at the moment
they form those expectations. The null hypothesis of orthogonality can be tested
using a regression of the following form:
Surpt =  Xt 1 + ⌫t (1.4.1)
where Surpt is the surprise measure calculated as the change in the short term
interest rates chosen, Xt 1 is a vector of variables that belongs to the information
set known ⌦t 1 at time t   1, and ⌫t is a random error term. If the assumption of
rationality or orthogonality is valid, then E(Surpt | ⌦t 1) = 0 which implies that the
coeﬃcient   = 0 in equation (1.4.1). As for variables from the information set ⌦t 1,
I choose the most recent change in the policy rate 4it 1, changes in US monetary
conditions, risk premia and international commodity prices that are captured by
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the lagged daily change of the 3 month T-Bill rate, the VIX and the Commodity
Research Bureau index (CRB), respectively. It would be recommendable to use other
set of variables such as forecasts for growth rate of domestic real GDP and domestic
inflation to evaluate if surprise measures are unexplained by the central bank response
to the economic conditions. However, there is limited data availability before the
adoption of IT that makes impossible the inclusion of these variables in these tests
of orthogonality. I use F-statistics to test the null hypothesis that all the coeﬃcients
(excluding the constant) from the regression (1.4.1) are equal to zero.
Table 1.1 shows the results of the orthogonality tests for the surprise measures
chosen in each country. Orthogonality of the chosen surprise measures to the set
of variables included in Xt 1 is not rejected at the 1% significance level. There is
evidence that the surprise measures appear to be rational as they are orthogonal
to lagged information which implies that all the information available at the time
agents form expectations is incorporated eﬃciently into this measures.
Table 1.1: Orthogonality Tests of Surprises
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Although the orthogonality hypothesis is not rejected for any of the surprise
measures chosen, and policy rate changes during IT are usually announced after
the market has closed, these surprises could be still contaminated. As I explained
previously, there is limited data availability before the adoption of IT that makes
impossible to include some variables in the orthogonality tests. As money market
interest rates changes could respond to other macroeconomic announcements apart
from the eﬀects of the policy rate, I check if the release dates for GDP, inflation
and global economic news coincide with any of the announcement days or the day
after the decision is released to the market. In addition, I examine if central banks
intervened in the foreign exchange market during any of these days, especially during
the period of the crawling band where the exchange rate was the intermediate target
of monetary policy. As Zettelmeyer (2004) notes, policy rate decisions could have
been correlated with the dynamics in the foreign exchange market. I only consider
as meeting days the days that are not contaminated by other events apart from the
monetary policy decision. 5
Monetary surprises might represent good or bad news in an IT regime. For
instance, if the central bank increases (decreases) the policy rate more than market
expectations in an scenario where actual inflation rate is considerably above (below)
the inflation target, this move could be taken as good news by the market as it
5I examine central banks press releases, announcements from institutes of statistics in each
country (e.g. IBGE in Brazil, INE in Chile and DANE in Colombia), Bloomberg and Factiva where
I can have access to premium news from the main newspapers and magazines. For instance, Factiva
provides news from Dinheiro, Folha de Sao Paulo and Primeira Pagina in Brazil; el Mercurio, La
Nacion and Diario Financiero in Chile, and El Tiempo in Colombia. Central bank foreign exchange
intervention and data on the exchange rate band is collected from central bank websites. It is
important to note that foreign exchange intervention data is not available in Colombia and Chile
before the adoption of IT. However, I check the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate within
the band defended during that period. I classify interest rate announcement days as other days if
the independence of the monetary policy decision was aﬀected when the exchange rate was exactly
at either of the edges of the exchange rate band. In addition, only announcement days when
central banks intervene actively in the foreign exchange market are classified as other days after
the adoption of IT. The main reason is that monetary policy under IT is more independent of the
exchange rate dynamics even if the central bank has a managed floating framework. Then, it is
more likely that interventions are correlated to monetary policy decisions during the band period.
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sends clear messages to the agents about the central bank commitment of achieving
price stability. However, if the central bank changes the policy rate more than
market expectations when the inflation rate is close to its target, this move could
be taken as bad news as it will raise inflation uncertainty. One clear example is
the Bank of Japan that although has not adopted an IT regime, it sets an annual
price stability target in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price
index. On October 31 2014, the Bank of Japan surprised the markets by accelerating
the increase in the monetary base at an annual pace of JPY80trn. In addition, it
decided to increase its purchases of Japanese government bonds at an annual pace of
JPY80trn and extending the average remaining maturity of these bonds purchases
to 7-10 years. These unexpected decisions were taken in an scenario of lowering of
the BOJ’s inflation and growth forecasts and were taken as very good news by global
markets.
It is important to note that the main objective of this paper is to study the impact
of interest rate announcements on the exchange behaviour, and if the eﬀect of these
announcements has changed after the adoption of IT, especially if they surprise the
market. However, it is fundamental to understand if there is any direct relation
between IT and surprises and thereby analyze their impact on exchange rate returns
and its volatility. To confirm this conjecture I estimate a simple equation of the
relation between the continuous surprise measures and IT. Using OLS, I evaluate if
IT has reduced the absolute size of surprises in the sample of the countries analyzed.
I include a dummy for IT as explanatory variable as follows:
Abs(Surpt) = ↵ +  ITt + "t (1.4.2)
where Abs(Surpt) is the absolute value of the interest rate change or surprises as
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explained earlier in this section; and the variable ITt is equal to 1 after the adoption
of IT and equal to 0 otherwise. In Table 1.2 and Figure A.4, I show that IT has re-
duced the absolute surprise size in all countries, confirming my previous conjecture.
In order to improve the power of explanation of this model, I could include control
variables. For instance, including a dummy variable equal to one when the central
bank announces the interest rate decision and zero otherwise captures the diﬀeren-
tial eﬀect that may have announcement days on the absolute size of surprises. In
addition, deviations of the observed inflation from the target set by the central bank
may have diﬀerential eﬀects on the size of surprises as agents will be more accurate
in their interest rate expectations if inflation is closer to the target. Nevertheless, I
only want to explain briefly if there is any relation between IT and the absolute size
of surprises.
Table 1.2: Impact of Inflation Targeting on Surprises
Figure A.5 shows the stepwise nature of interest rate decisions respectively in all
countries before and after IT. I exclude atypical changes in policy rates before the
adoption of IT. From Figure A.5, it is evident that at least in 40% of BOD meetings
the policy rate was not changed and changes have been made in 25 bp steps after
the adoption of IT. It is important to note that no changes in the policy rate can be
a surprise in the market.
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In order to check the accuracy of the continuous surprise measures, I calcu-
late their correlation on announcement days with the surprises derived from the
Bloomberg survey to analyze if I am capturing a similar pattern. A monetary an-
nouncement is classified as a surprise using the Bloomberg survey if there is any
diﬀerence between the actual change of the policy rate and the survey median. For
instance, Melvin et. al (2004 and 2010) use the Bloomberg survey to study the im-
pact of monetary announcements in the UK. Table 1.3 and Figure A.6 compare my
continuous surprise measures based on short term interest rates and the Bloomberg
surprises in Colombia, Chile, and Brazil. It is evident the strong correlation between
these two measures in Chile and Brazil. For Chile the correlation is 70% while for
Brazil is 47%. For Colombia the correlation is only 10%. This could be explained
by other factors in the interbank market such as periods of liquidity stress diﬃcult
to disentangle from my measures.
Table 1.3: Correlation Between Surprise Measures and Bloomberg Survey Surprises
Table 1.4 shows the specific dates for each period by country, the number of
BOD meeting days and the corresponding absolute size of the continuous surprise
measures based on short term rates changes. From Table 1.4, I could infer that the
average absolute size of surprises has been reduced after the adoption of IT.
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Table 1.4: Board of Directors Meetings and Surprise Measures
A caveat in this analysis is that the sample size used before the adoption of
IT is smaller than after IT because the period analyzed starts when Central Banks
introduced new mechanisms to give more stability to the interest rates, and in some
cases the only information available corresponds to the date of the announcement
when it was an eﬀective change in the policy rate. This could aﬀect the frequency
and size of surprises in the sample.
Figure A.7 shows the degree of association between short term interest rate
changes or continuous surprises and exchange rate returns on announcement days
before and after the adoption of IT. The data with label Pre and Post corresponds
to the pre-IT period and post-IT period, respectively. I could infer from the scatter
plots that in Brazil there is more acceptable range of surprises and a smaller sur-
prise size after the adoption of IT. This is reflected in the concentration of the data
around zero which implies that surprise announcements have reduced their eﬀect on
exchange rate returns. There is not a clear relationship between monetary policy
shocks and exchange rate returns in Colombia and Chile. However, I only could give
evidence that IT has changed the mechanism through which surprise announcements




Following the same methodology employed by Melvin et. al (2004 and 2010), the
questions to be examined are:
1. Are exchange rate returns diﬀerent on days when the BOD meets?
2. Have surprise monetary announcements diminished their eﬀect on daily exchange
rate returns after the adoption of IT?
3. Is information contained in surprise monetary announcements useful in explaining
extreme exchange rate returns?
I shall now examine each question in turn:
1. Are exchange rate returns diﬀerent on days when the BOD meets?
To answer this question, I test the equality of means and variances across diﬀerent
days. I compare exchange rate returns on BOD announcement days with exchange
rate returns on days outside the interest rate decision process. I only use the days
when the BOD announces the new policy rate as the information from these days is
the only made public in these countries, with the exception of Chile where the report
from the briefing day is made public before the final decision.
A one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) for unbalanced data is used in order to
test if there is equality of means in exchange rate returns between the announcement
days and the other no meeting days. Given that the groups sizes are diﬀerent, and I
want to compare the diﬀerence in means between the BOD announcement days with
all the other days, called the control group, I use the Dunnett￿s test using the GLM
(General Linear Model) procedure. I assume three groups of days. The days when
the BOD announces the policy rate Daya, the days when there is a change in the
policy rate Dayach, and the other no meeting days or control group called Others.
The null hypothesis considering two groups of BOD meeting days and one control
group is described as follows:
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H0 : ui = u0 vs H1 : ui 6= u0 for i = 1, 2 (1.4.3)
where ui is the mean of the ith experimental group (Daya or Dayach) and u0 is
the mean of the control group (Others). Assuming that the variance for xi   x0 is
equal to  2i , the test computed has a t-distribution ti = xi xo ˆi
Under the GLM procedure,  ˆi =
q
s2 ⇤ ( 1Ni + 1No ) whereNi andN0 are the sample
size of the ith experimental group and the control group respectively, and s2 is the
pooled variance. The significance level for the equality of means test is the p-value
for the F-test on the dependent variable that in this case is the exchange rate returns.
Within the GLM procedure, I use the Levene￿s Test for Homogeneity of Variances
to confirm if there is any substantial diﬀerence in the variance between groups of
days. This test is more robust under distributions that seem non normal and derives
a dispersion variable from the original values of the dependent variable in order
to perform an analysis of variance. According to Levene (1960) the tests based
on any of the following dispersion variables are satisfactory. The first one equal to
z2ij = (yij yi)2, and the second one equal to zij = |yij yi|. Although both measures
report similar results, only the estimations based on the first dispersion variable are





2 = ..... =  
2
k vs H1 :  
2
i 6=  2j for at least one pair(i, j) (1.4.4)
where  2i is the variance of the ith experimental group. In addition, the signifi-
cance level for this test is the p-value for the F-test.
2. Have surprise monetary announcements diminished their eﬀect on daily exchange
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rate returns after the adoption of IT?
As in Melvin et al. (2004 and 2010), I estimate a model of exchange rate returns
by OLS where the independent variables are dummy variables equal to 1 on days
where the BOD meets and announce the new policy rate, and equal to 0 in other case
(Dayat). In addition, I include a continuous surprise measure Surpt based on changes
in short term interbank rates as I explained in the previous section and as controls
4Xt the daily variation of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility
Index (VIX) and the Thomson/Reuters Core Commodity Research Bureau index
(CRB) obtained from Datastream. To analyze how the eﬀect of surprise measures
have changed after the adoption of IT, I include a dummy variable ITt equal to 1
after the adoption of IT and equal to 0 otherwise. This implies the inclusion of
interaction terms described in the following model:
4et = µ+ c14et 1 + ....+ cn4et n
+⌘0Dayat + ⌘1Surpt + ⌘2ITt
+ 0DayatITt +  1SurptITt +  4Xt + "t
(1.4.5)
If there is evidence of GARCH eﬀects, I use Melvin et al. (2004 and 2010) specifi-
cation of the conditional variance. As I focus on the eﬀects of surprise announcements
on meeting days after the adoption of IT, I include these variables multiplicatively
into the conditional variance. The reason as in Melvin et al. (2010) is that the
impact of announcements have only a transitory eﬀect on the conditional variance.
6 The AR(p)-GARCH (1,1) regression model estimated is described as follows:
6This methodology follows Jones et al. (1998).
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4et = µ+ c14et 1 + ....+ cn4et n
+⌘0Dayat + ⌘1Surpt + ⌘2ITt
+ 0DayatITt +  1SurptITt +  4Xt +pst"t
"t | ⌦t 1 ⇠ N(0, ht)
st = (1 +  0Dayat +  1Surpt +  2ITt +  3DayatITt +  4SurptITt)




where ! > 0, ↵ > 0,   > 0 and the condition ↵+  < 1 implies that the GARCH
process is weakly stationary. This specification indicates that the conditional vari-
ance on any day t is equal to stht and any of the coeﬃcients of st represents the
percentage increase in the exchange rate volatility associated to any of the vari-
ables included into the conditional variance. For instance, (1 +  0)ht represents the
conditional variance on any announcement day.
Nelson and Cao (1992) argue that the linear GARCH model has limitations due
to the non-negativity constraints on the parameters. Modelling the logarithm of the
variance guarantee its non-negativity, especially when some explanatory variables
have negative values. As mentioned before, monetary shocks could represent good
or bad news in an IT regime and this suggests that the behavior of exchange rate
volatility in response to shocks should be asymmetric. In this sense, the EGARCH
specification seems appropriate to model asymmetric eﬀects as negative and pos-
itive shocks might have diﬀerential eﬀects on exchange rate volatility. I evaluate
if the GARCH specification or the EGARCH model is more appropriate to study
the eﬀects of interest rate announcements on the exchange rate behaviour. Follow-
ing Nelson (1991) that proposed an Exponential GARCH (EGARCH), the AR(p)-
EGARCH(1,1) regression model estimated is described as follows:
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4et = µ+ c14et 1 + ....+ cn4et n
+⌘0Dayat + ⌘1Surpt + ⌘2ITt
+ 0DayatITt +  1SurptITt +  4Xt + "t
"t | ⌦t 1 ⇠ N(0, ht)
ln(ht) = ! + ↵g(zt 1) +  ln(ht 1) +  0Dayat +  1Surpt
+ 2ITt +  3DayatITt +  4SurptITt
(1.4.7)
where g(zt) = ✓zt + '[|zt|   E|zt|], zt = "t/
p
ht and w, ↵,  , ✓ and ' are real
numbers. ✓ and ' are the asymmetric and symmetric eﬀects, respectively. If zt
is a standard Gaussian random variable, E|zt| =
p
2/⇡. There is multiplicative
heteroskedasticity in the EGARCH model as in the GARCH specification because
the conditional variance is specified in logs.
3. Is information contained in surprise monetary announcements useful in explaining
extreme exchange rate returns?
I use a logistic model of extreme exchange rate events to answer this final question.
As in Melvin et al. (2004), if at any day the absolute value of exchange rate returns
exceeds 2.5 standard deviation of the entire exchange rate returns sample, this day
is called an extreme exchange rate event. In this analysis, a response binary variable
is created which is equal to 1 on days when there is an extreme exchange rate event
and equal to 0 otherwise. In addition, I calculate the marginal eﬀects to explain how
a change in the probability of having an extreme exchange rate event is related to






= Intercept+  0Dayat +  1Surpt
(1.4.8)
+ 2ITt +  3DayatITt +  4SurptITt




1 + e ˆlogit
(1.4.9)
1.5 Empirical Results
As in Melvin et al. (2004), the first question to be addressed is:
1. Are exchange rate returns diﬀerent on days when the BOD meets?
The results are reported in Table 1.5. In Colombia, Chile and Brazil there are no
significant diﬀerences in means of exchange rate returns between the diﬀerent groups
of days, and there is homogeneity of variances in both periods. The only exception
is Brazil before the adoption of IT where the hypothesis of no significant diﬀerences
in means is rejected at the 5% significance level and Chile where the hypothesis of
homogeneity of variances is rejected at the 1% significance level. The hypothesis of
equality of means is not rejected for Colombia given the p-values of 0.58 and 0.81 for
pre-IT and IT periods, respectively. Additionally, the hypothesis of homogeneity of
variances of daily exchange returns using the Levene’s Test is not rejected according
to the p-values of 0.86 and 0.82 in the same periods for Colombia. Similar results are
obtained for Brazil and Chile. These results imply that in overall it is not possible
to conclude that exchange rate returns behave diﬀerent between announcement days
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and other days. However, GARCH and Logit models are estimated as in Melvin et
al. (2004 and 2010) to confirm the impact of surprise policy rate announcements on
the exchange rate behaviour.
Table 1.5: Test of Equality of Means and Variances of Exchange Rate Returns
2. Have surprise monetary announcements on BOD meeting days diminished their
eﬀect on daily exchange rate returns after the adoption of IT?
I initially estimated the model of equation (1.4.5) by OLS, and the results indicate
that the variables related to the BOD meeting days are not powerful in explaining
exchange rate returns. However, as in Melvin et al. (2004 and 2010), GARCH eﬀects
are found in the estimations and I estimate the GARCH specification represented by
equation (1.4.6) but with the mean equation equal to:
4et = µ+ c14et 1 + ....+ cn4et n +  4Xt +pst"t (1.5.1)
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As I find strong persistence in the parameters estimated of the conditional variance
that could lead to an integrated GARCH (IGARCH) model, I choose an EGARCH
model as my preferred specification due to the reasons explained in the previous
section. I estimate an EGARCH model for each country under the assumption that
errors follow a generalized error distribution (GED) as the shape parameter of that
distribution results significant and less than 2. This indicates that the distribution of
the residuals appear to have fatter tails than the residuals of the normal distribution.
7As in the GARCH case, the mean equation does not include the variables related
to announcement days and surprises as they are not significant. The reached speci-
fication for each country corresponds to an AR(2)-EGARCH(1,1) model as follows:
4et = µ+ c14et 1 + c24et 2 +  4Xt + "t
"t | ⌦t 1 ⇠ N(0, ht)
ln(ht) = ! + ↵g(zt 1) +  ln(ht 1) +  0Dayat +  1Surpt
+ 2ITt +  3DayatITt +  4SurptITt
(1.5.2)
Table 1.6 shows the estimations of the EGARCH model in each country. In order
to control for the recent financial crisis, I include a dummy Crisis equal to one
for the period January 2 2008 to June 30 2009 and zero otherwise. 8The results
indicate that the eﬀect of inflation targeting on exchange rate volatility is positive and
statistically significant at 1% level in all countries. In addition, the estimates of the
interaction terms between inflation and announcement days and surprise measures
attain the expected sign indicating a decrease in volatility after the adoption of IT.
The asymmetric coeﬃcients captured by ✓ are positive and significant at the 1%
significance level, implying that positive shocks are more destabilizing than negative
7The shape parameter is equal to 2 when the residuals are distributed normal.
8The crisis period is selected according to the business cycle reference dates announced by the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
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Table 1.6: EGARCH Models for Exchange Rate Returns
shocks of equal magnitude. Although the asymmetric eﬀect is smaller than the sym-
metric eﬀect in each country, this result does not imply that there is no a diﬀerential
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eﬀect of good news and bad news as ✓ is significant in all the estimations.
I use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis with the EGARCH estimates before and
after the adoption of IT to examine the overall eﬀects in volatility of announcement
days and days when the interest rate announcement surprises the market. The
coeﬃcients in Table 1.7 are the result of linear combinations of the estimates from
the EGARCH model. For instance, the coeﬃcient Daya before the adoption of IT
corresponds to the coeﬃcient Daya in the EGARCH estimations. The coeﬃcient
Daya after the adoption of IT is the sum of the coeﬃcient Daya plus the interaction
term Daya ⇤ IT as I want to measure the eﬀect of announcement days after the
adoption of IT. The coeﬃcients in the second row correspond to the impact of surprise
announcements on interest rate decision days. For instance, the coeﬃcient Surp
before the adoption of IT corresponds to the coeﬃcient of the announcement day
Daya plus the coeﬃcient of surprises Surp. In addition, the coeﬃcient Surp after
the adoption of IT corresponds to the coeﬃcient of the announcement day Daya plus
the coeﬃcient of surprises Surp, plus the interaction terms Daya⇤IT and Surp⇤IT .
The results reported in Table 1.7 indicate that the exchange rate volatility in
Colombia behaves diﬀerent on announcement days Daya and even more when the
announcement is a surprise Surp. Exchange rate volatility increases by 72% before
IT and by 9% after IT on days when the interest rate announcement is a surprise.
However, if I consider the eﬀect of IT, exchange rate volatility is about 64% lower
after the adoption of IT. This confirm my previous conjecture that IT has diminished
the impact of surprise interest rate announcements on exchange rate volatility and
it may be related to the systematic change in market expectations. It is important
to note that these results could be aﬀected by the pre-IT period because at that
time was introduced an interest rate band to reduce the interest rate volatility. This
implies when an interest rate decision was made before the adoption of IT to maintain
the exchange rate within the band, the market thought it was going to be profitable,
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and this does not happen under a flexible regime.
Table 1.7: The Eﬀect of Interest Rate Announcements on Exchange Rate Volatility
I find that in Chile exchange rate volatility has decreased about 42% after the
adoption of IT on days when the Central Bank surprise the market. The results
for Brazil are similar to those in Colombia as volatility on surprise announcement
days increases about 74% and 13% pre-IT and post-IT respectively. This implies a
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reduction in volatility of about 60% after the adoption of IT and confirms that IT
has changed the relationship between monetary policy announcements and exchange
rate volatility. The results for Chile may be more moderate as during the 1990s the
Central Bank adopted an implicit IT regime.
Table 1.8 consolidates the results by country. The estimations indicate that the
relationship of surprise announcements with exchange rate volatility is aﬀected by
the monetary regime adopted, in this case IT. There is evidence for Colombia, Chile
and Brazil that exchange rate volatility on surprise announcement days is lower af-
ter the adoption of IT. It is important to note that is not possible to disentangle
if the overall eﬀect comes from the adoption of IT or the adoption of a flexible ex-
change rate regime as in Colombia and Chile both were adopted simultaneously, and
in Brazil there is only a time gap of five months. However, the literature on ex-
change rate determination advocates for an increase in exchange rate volatility after
the elimination of a fixed exchange rate regime. For instance, Taylor (1995) notes
that the literature has found evidence of higher variability in the nominal exchange
rate during floating exchange rate regimes than fixed exchange rate frameworks. In
addition, he explains that a number of papers evidence lower variability of macroe-
conomic fundamentals than nominal exchange rates during flexible exchange rate
regimes that have enhanced the study of other factors not reflected in the traditional
macroeconomic fundamentals. Following this evidence, it is likely that in this paper
IT and not the adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime explains the notable re-
duction in exchange rate volatility on announcement days due to higher transparency
and credibility in central bank policies.
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Table 1.8: Overall Eﬀects of Interest Rate Announcements on Exchange Rate Volatil-
ity after the Adoption of IT
3. Is information contained in surprise monetary announcements on BOD meeting
days useful in explaining extreme exchange rate returns?
The coeﬃcients on announcement days Daya and continuous surprises Surp are
not significant in explaining extreme exchange rate returns in Colombia, Chile, and
Brazil. However, the coeﬃcients on inflation IT and the recent financial crisis Crisis
are significant in all countries. The results are reported in Table 1.9 and I only show
the fitted models with significant variables. The probability of evidence an extreme
exchange rate return event increases by about 2.7% in Colombia, 2.7% in Chile,
and 2.6% in Brazil. Then, I analyze the marginal eﬀect of each variable on the
dependent variable. The predicted probability of having an extreme exchange rate
return in Colombia is 2.1% lower after the adoption of IT and 6.6% greater during
the recent financial crisis. In Chile and Brazil, the probability of having an extreme
exchange rate return is 2.5% and 5.4% lower after the adoption of IT respectively,
and 5.3% and 3.7% greater during the financial crisis. In general, there is no evidence
that information on announcement days has changed the probability of evidence an
extreme exchange rate return in the country sample, while IT and the recent financial
crisis have aﬀected that probability.
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Table 1.9: Logit Models for Extreme Exchange Rate Returns
1.6 Conclusions and Future Research
The exchange rate determination analysis in EMEs has usually been developed from
a macroeconomic perspective using conventional and Taylor Rule models. This paper
studies the exchange rate dynamics from a microeconomic perspective in EMEs. This
study is of interest to economic policymakers because helps to understand the impact
of interest rate announcements on exchange rate returns and its volatility in EMEs
under IT. In addition, it is helpful in the formulation of appropriate policies in the
exchange rate market without generating more disturbances.
I examine if the exchange rate returns and its volatility behave diﬀerently on sur-
prise announcement days and if IT has changed the mechanisms through which these
surprises impact the foreign exchange market using daily data. I include Colombia,
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Chile and Brazil in the study. This analysis has not been studied before in industri-
alized and developing countries as I consider the pre-IT and post-IT periods.
Firstly, I tests the equality of means of returns and homogeneity of variances. The
results for all countries indicate that there are no significant diﬀerences in means re-
turns between announcement days and the other days. In addition, there is evidence
of homogeneity of variances between policy rate announcement days and the other
days. Secondly, I find that information on announcement days does not aﬀect the
exchange rate returns. However, I model the conditional volatility using EGARCH
models, including dummy variables associated to announcement days and continuous
surprise measures. The results for all countries show evidence that exchange rate
volatility increases on BOD meeting days when the announcements represent a sur-
prise for the market. However, the exchange rate volatility on announcement days
and days when the market is surprised is lower after the adoption of IT in Colombia,
Brazil and Chile.
It is important to note that the results indicate significant diﬀerences in exchange
rate volatility on surprise announcements days and IT has changed the relationship
between monetary policy announcements and exchange rate volatility. Although it
is not possible to disentangle the overall eﬀect from the adoption of IT and the
adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime as both were adopted simultaneously in
these countries, the literature advocates for an increasing volatility after the adoption
of a flexible exchange rate regime that may indicate that IT is the factor driving my
results.
Finally, I use Logit models to explain if the information on surprise announcement
days explain extreme exchange rate returns. There is no evidence that information
on surprise announcement days has changed the probability of evidence an extreme
exchange rate return in the country sample, while IT and the recent financial crisis
have aﬀected that probability. The probability of having an extreme exchange rate
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return is lower after the adoption of IT and expectedly higher during the recent
financial crisis in all countries.
As an agenda for future research is interesting to use techniques such as the
wild bootstrap in order to specify more accurately the mean equation irrespective of
the variance equation. This method is diﬀerent from the residual bootstrap in that
allows for heteroskedasticity of unknown form by conditioning on the transformed
residuals. The main idea of the wild bootstrap technique is to leave the explanatory
variables at their sample value and to resample the dependent variable based on the
transformed residuals that are multiplied by a random variable with mean 0 and
variance 1. The most common choice for the random variable is Mammen’s two-
point distribution which involves two diﬀerent probabilities and the Rademacher
distribution where the bootstrap residuals are positive with probability one-half. An
alternative to these distributions is the standard normal distribution. However, it
has sometimes the problem that imposes symmetry as the Rademacher distribution.
In addition, it would be interesting to use diﬀerent procedures to detect structural
breaks in order to evaluate if the break in the data was really precisely at the time
of the adoption of IT, or if it occurred before or after. For instance, the Chow test
(1960) would be useful to evaluate structural changes at a known break date that in
this case corresponds to the date of the adoption of IT. Furthermore, the test of Bai
and Perron (1998, 2003) evaluates structural changes at unknown break dates to see




Figure A.1: Exchange Rate Band in Colombia
Figure A.2: Exchange Rate Band in Chile
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Figure A.3: Exchange Rate Band in Brazil
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Figure A.4: Continuous Surprises Measures Before and After the Adoption of Infla-
tion Targeting
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Figure A.5: Histograms of Policy Interest Rate Changes
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Figure A.6: Monetary Surprises Based on Short Term Interest Rates and Bloomberg
Expectations
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Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics of Exchange Rates before Inflation Targeting
Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics of Exchange Rates during Inflation Targeting
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Chapter 2
The Eﬀectiveness of Foreign
Exchange Intervention in Latin
America: A Nonlinear Approach of
the Coordination Channel
2.1 Introduction
The literature on the eﬀectiveness of exchange rate intervention in Emerging Economies
(EMEs) has grown up during the last decade. However, as Menkhoﬀ (2013) explains
in his survey of empirical studies on foreign exchange rate intervention in EMEs,
empirical research in this area is still focused in advanced economies. Studying the
eﬀectiveness of foreign exchange rate intervention is of crucial importance for policy-
makers, especially in Latin America where exchange rate intervention is an important
part of Central Bank policies.
The main objective of this paper is to find empirical evidence that exchange
rate misalignments in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru may be caused
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by nonlinear factors that force fundamentals-based traders to exit the market and
this is the result of a coordination failure in the market. Following Reitz and Taylor
(2008), the hypothesis is that foreign exchange intervention may act as a coordinating
instrument that encourage traders to re-enter the market and revert the path of the
exchange rate into a stable regime.
Empirical studies in Latin America have analyzed foreign exchange intervention
eﬀectiveness under the portfolio and signaling channels. The importance of the co-
ordination channel and the existence of nonlinearities in deviations of the exchange
rate from its fundamental value have been neglected in Latin America and this is
reflected in the lack of research in this area. I want to fill this gap using a microstruc-
tural model based on heterogeneous agents where exchange rates are determined by
the process of order flow trading in a market with uninformed and informed traders
that is consistent with the coordination channel approach. The theoretical model is
an extension of Reitz and Taylor (2008) to EMEs in Latin America. In addition,
I include a measure of time-varying risk that is crucial in models that analyze the
impact of foreign exchange intervention on exchange rate returns in these economies.
This measure captures the behaviour of risk averse foreign exchange market partic-
ipants and supports the idea that the rejection of the risk-neutral eﬃcient markets
hypothesis may be the result of a time-varying risk premia.
I use a Smooth Transition Regression GARCH-M (STR-GARCH-M) model to
examine the empirical evidence of this microstructural approach in terms of the
eﬀectiveness of foreign exchange interventions conducted in Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico and Peru. I include these countries in my analysis due to diﬀerent reasons.
First, the data availability at daily basis within all the emerging economies that
intervene actively in the foreign exchange market. Second, these economies have
inflation targeting and a managed floating exchange rate regime as a framework of
monetary policy and foreign exchange policy, respectively. In addition, they exhibit
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large exchange rate dependencies as noted by Gomez et al. (2012). Using daily
data from 2000 and 2013, the results provide evidence of a nonlinear mean reverting
process of exchange rates with the exception of Chile. In addition, I find that foreign
exchange intervention has increased traders confidence in exchange rate fundamentals
and has been eﬀective in increasing the degree of mean reversion of exchange rates
to a stable regime under a coordination channel perspective. Furthermore, the risk
premia measured by the standard deviation of the conditional variance reduces the
pace of domestic depreciation as risk averse investors require a higher rate of return
from holding the domestic currency.
In Chapter 1, I model the exchange rate behaviour in similar countries (i.e. Brazil,
Chile, and Colombia). However, I use diﬀerent specifications between chapters due
to two main reasons. First, the data sample in Chapter 1 considers two diﬀerent
periods. The period where the exchange rate band was a nominal anchor and the
period after the adoption of inflation targeting. In Chapter 2, I only focus on the
period under inflation targeting as the data on foreign exchange intervention is only
available after 2000 in all countries. Diﬀerent samples between chapters may result
in diﬀerent specifications of the autoregressive part of the mean. For instance, in
Chapter 1, I reach a specification of the mean equation for exchange rate returns of
order AR(2), while in this chapter the specification of the mean equation is of order
AR(1). Second, I analyse in this chapter the coordination channel of foreign exchange
intervention that usually employs non linear models relying on the assumption that
non linear factors aﬀect the dynamic of exchange rates.
The model used in this paper is part of the incipient literature on foreign exchange
market microstructure in Latin America. The microstructure approach of exchange
rate determination diﬀers from the conventional macroeconomic approach in that
not all information is publicly available and there is heterogeneity between market
participants. Lyons (2001) explains that order flow as a fundamental variable in
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this approach is a signed transaction volume that contains relevant information to
exchange rates because contains the dealer’s interpretation of fundamentals that is
priced in the trading process. The empirical evidence on exchange rate determination
in advanced economies finds that order flow has a higher degree of explanatory power
of exchange rate behaviour than traditional macroeconomic fundamentals. As Sarno
and Taylor (2002) explain, order flow capability to explain the pattern of exchange
rates relies on its predictability of macroeconomic fundamentals expectations, poorly
measured by the traditional macroeconomic approach.
Lyons (2001) notes that if central banks attempt to maintain a fixed exchange
rate, they learn from order flow if fundamentals are consistent with the peg. There
is such consistency when the private net order flow or the diﬀerence between buyer-
initiated and seller-initiated orders is close to zero. This is not the case of a flexible
exchange rate regime when the central bank does not intervene in the foreign ex-
change market. When the exchange rate regime is managed floating as in the case
of the countries analyzed in this paper, central banks still learn from order flow if
exchange rate is deviating from its fundamental value. From this learning process,
central bank intervention may act as a coordinating tool that encourage informed
dealers to re-enter the market and revert the exchange rate pattern to an stable path
consistent with fundamentals.
This paper focuses on the eﬀects of sterilized intervention on the exchange rate
dynamics as non sterilized intervention may aﬀect the exchange rate by a similar
mechanism of transmission to conventional monetary policy. As Sarno and Tay-
lor (2001) explain, there are two reference channels in the literature that address
the question of how sterilized exchange rate intervention may aﬀect the exchange
rate: the portfolio and the signaling channel. Sterilized foreign exchange interven-
tion works under the portfolio channel if there is imperfect substitution between
domestic and foreign assets as purchases or sales of foreign currency change portfolio
55
assets composition and has a direct impact on the spot exchange rate. As Sarno and
Taylor (2001) note, imperfect substitutability is unlikely to hold in highly integrated
markets, especially in developed economies and that is the main reason that the em-
pirical evidence on this channel is mixed. Through the signaling channel monetary
authorities could send clear messages about the future stance of monetary policy
and aﬀect the level of the exchange rate through changes in expectations. Neely
(2008) notes that central bankers in emerging markets report that both channels of
intervention work but the signaling channel is stronger in terms of the eﬀectiveness
of intervention. From the signaling channel perspective, foreign exchange interven-
tion eﬀectiveness in Latin America may rely on the consistency between monetary
and foreign exchange policies. Consistency between policies do not put in risk the
commitment to an inflation target and avoid unclear messages to the market about
the future stance of monetary policy that may aﬀect the eﬀectiveness of foreign ex-
change intervention through expectations. Taylor (1994, 2004, 2005) and Sarno and
Taylor (2001) discuss a third channel called the coordination channel. Persistent de-
viations of the exchange rate from its fundamental value may be caused by the lack
of coordination between traders when they form their expectations. As Sarno and
Taylor (2001) note foreign exchange rate intervention may work as a coordinating
tool that encourage fundamentals-based speculators to trade actively in the market
and increase the degree of mean reversion of the exchange rate to a stable path.
Although this paper focuses on the coordination channel of foreign exchange in-
tervention, it is noteworthy to mention the relevant literature on the eﬀectiveness
of foreign exchange intervention in Latin America. For instance, Nascimento and
Ribeiro (2011) analyzes the eﬀectiveness of foreign exchange intervention in Brazil
between 1999 and 2006. They note that the impact of central bank intervention
on the exchange rate conditional volatility depends on the type of intervention an-
alyzed such as spot market auctions. Tapia and Tokman (2004) use daily data for
56
Chile covering the period 1998 to 2003 and find that the eﬀect of foreign exchange
intervention is small but public announcements or oral interventions during that pe-
riod influenced the level and trend of the exchange rate. Kamil (2008) studies the
eﬀectiveness of central bank intervention in Colombia between 2004 and 2007. Dur-
ing that period, foreign exchange intervention was eﬀective when foreign currency
purchases were consistent with an easing monetary policy and ineﬀective when the
central bank had a conflict between achieving the inflation target and fighting against
currency appreciation. Mundaca (2011) uses intraday data for Peru between 2004
and 2009 and finds evidence that foreign exchange intervention moves the exchange
rate to the desired level during the time frame at which the Central Bank is active
intervening in the foreign exchange market. As Menkhoﬀ (2013) states this result
support the portfolio channel rather than the signaling channel as outside the in-
tervention window intervention has a diminished eﬀect on market expectations. In
addition, there is empirical evidence that the Peruvian Sol has been less volatile
when the Central Bank has intervened in the market. Finally, Guimaraes and Kara-
cadag (2004) find evidence in Mexico that the eﬀect of foreign exchange intervention
is diﬀerent for both the level and volatility of exchange rate. While the impact on
the level is limited, sales of foreign currency increase short-term volatility.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains the
theoretical microstructural approach of the coordination channel used in this paper.
Section 2.3 describes the empirical methodology. Section 2.4 describes the data set.
Section 2.5 discusses the empirical results. In section 2.6, I include the results of
robustness checks of the baseline model. Section 2.7 covers the conclusions and
discusses future research.
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2.2 A Microstructural Approach of the Coordina-
tion Channel
The framework used in this paper combines the coordination channel model de-
veloped by Reitz and Taylor (2008) with the theory on foreign exchange market
eﬃciency, where the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition may be adjusted
by a risk premium component. Reitz and Taylor (2008) and Reitz et al. (2010) focus
their approach on developed economies and include the interest rate diﬀerential as
an unbiased predictor of the spot exchange rate change according to the UIP condi-
tion. However, due to the higher degree of foreign exchange risk perceived by foreign
exchange market participants in EMEs, I include a risk premia component in this
model. The assumption of non-risk neutrality of market participants modelled by
a time-varying risk premium component does not rule out other possible explana-
tions of the UIP condition failure such as the rejection of the rational expectations
hypothesis. Modelling risk premium is still a matter of research as there are diﬀer-
ent factors that may aﬀect its dynamics and there is still no common consensus on
which measure is the most appropriate. As Fama (1984) notes if there is correlation
between the forward premium and a time-varying measure of risk, this could pro-
duce biased results when testing the market eﬃcient hypothesis. Nevertheless, the
aim of this paper is to study the coordination role of central bank intervention in
a framework where risk premia plays an important role in explaining the exchange
rate behaviour.
The main assumption of this model is that order flow conveys relevant information
in exchange rate determination and the foreign exchange market is composed by
uninformed and informed traders with heterogeneous beliefs. The variation in the
exchange rate is assumed to be a function of net order flow from these agents:
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st+1 = st + a
M(OFUt +OF
I
t ) + "t+1 (2.2.1)
where st+1 and st is the logarithm of the spot exchange rate at time t+1 and at time
t, respectively. OFUt and OF It are the net order flow from uninformed or chartists
traders, and informed or fundamentalists-based traders, respectively. The exchange
rate is the units of domestic currency per one unit of foreign currency that in this case
is the US Dollar. As Reitz and Taylor (2008) note, exchange rates are determined
by two main factors. First, the available public information captured by "t+1, and
second, by order flow that may or may not be related to public macroeconomic news
captured by OFUt + OF It . The market maker determines the future path of the
exchange rate depending on the number of orders filled and this is captured by the
reaction coeﬃcient aM expected to be positive.
According to the UIP condition if the risk-neutral foreign exchange market ef-
ficiency hypothesis holds, the expected exchange rate depreciation should be equal
to the interest rate diﬀerential between the domestic and the foreign nominal inter-
est rates on similar securities. However, if market participants are risk averse, as
I assume in this model, the interest rate diﬀerential is equal to the expected spot
exchange rate depreciation plus a risk premium ⇢t as follows:
it   i⇤t = Etst+1   st + ⇢t (2.2.2)
As the failure of the eﬃcient market hypothesis may be due to the rejection of
the risk neutrality condition or the rejection of the rational expectations hypothesis,
or both, I assume that rational expectations hold (st+1 = Etst+1 + ⌘t+1) in order to
model the existence of a time-varying risk premia that in my approach I assume as
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exogenous. The UIP adjusted by a risk premium is defined as:
it   i⇤t = st+1   st + ⇢t   ⌘t+1 (2.2.3)
st+1   st = it   i⇤t   ⇢t + ⌘t+1 (2.2.4)
Domowitz and Hakkio (1985) study the existence of a time-varying risk premia in
the foreign exchange market of some developed countries. Following their formula-
tion, the risk premium pt is composed by a constant term   and a time-varying term
 t equal to the conditional part of the standard deviation of the rational expectations
forecast error term ⌘t+1 as follows:
⇢t =  +  t (2.2.5)
As Sarno and Taylor (2002) note, chartists analyze patterns, trends and relevant
information from statistical indicators in order to predict short term exchange rate
movements. Chartist analysis has become important in foreign exchange trading and
it plays a crucial role in an order flow-driven foreign exchange market. This model
assumes that net order flow from chartists or uninformed traders is a function of the
recent exchange rate return and the expected change of the exchange rate. Under
rational expectations and the existence of a time-varying risk premia, the expected
exchange rate depreciation is equal to the actual change of the exchange rate adjusted
by a risk premium and a rational expectations error according to equations (2.2.2)
to (2.2.4). The uninformed traders’ orders is defined as:
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OFUt = a
U(st   st 1) + bU(it   i⇤t )  ⇢Ut + ⌘Ut+1 (2.2.6)
⇢Ut =  
U + dU t (2.2.7)
where it and i⇤t represent the overnight interest rates of domestic and foreign cur-
rency deposits, respectively. As chartists determine the exchange rate behaviour
according to past patterns and trends, aU is expected to be positive. The sign of
bU is ambiguous according to the forward premium puzzle found in the literature. If
the covered interest parity holds, the UIP implies that the forward premium should
be an unbiased predictor of the expected exchange rate depreciation, suggesting a
positive sign for bU . However, Sarno and Taylor (2002) explain that the empirical
evidence on the foreign exchange market eﬃciency hypothesis using the UIP condi-
tion have found the existence of a forward rate bias that would suggest a negative
sign for bU . If  Uand dU are equal to zero there is no risk aversion, while if they are
diﬀerent than zero there is evidence of a time-varying risk premia.
Fundamentalists or informed traders analyze exchange rate fundamentals to pre-
dict the future change of exchange rates. Their analysis relies on their perception
about the long-run exchange rate fundamental equilibrium value ft. The exchange
rate is expected to reach this equilibrium level over time. According to Reitz and
Taylor (2008), exchange rate deviations from its equilibrium level are important in
determining net order flow for informed traders. The weight imposed to exchange
rate misalignments wt may not be constant over time as the confidence of traders
in exchange rate fundamentals varies over time. Net order flow for informed traders
depends on the deviation of the exchange rate from its long-run equilibrium value,
and the interest rate diﬀerential plus a risk premium factor as in the uninformed
traders case:
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OF It = a
Iwt(ft   st) + bI(it   i⇤t )  ⇢It + ⌘I t+1 (2.2.8)
⇢It =  
I + dI t (2.2.9)
where aI is a reaction coeﬃcient expected to be positive; wt takes values between zero
and unity; the sign of bI is ambiguous as in the chartists case; and dI is expected to
be diﬀerent than zero. Reitz and Taylor (2008) note that a higher weight wt reflects
an increasing confidence ct of informed traders in exchange rate fundamentals and it





ct =  ( 1    2DtINTt) |ft   st|
 st
(2.2.11)
where wt is a logistic function varying between zero and one; DtINTt is a measure of
central bank foreign exchange intervention; ft   st measures the degree of exchange
rate misalignment; and  st is the conditional standard deviation of exchange rate
changes. wt is a function expressed in line with the study of De Grauwe and Grimaldi
(2006) that evaluate the relative profitability of heterogeneous agents forecasting
rules and the probability to switch to the better one.
If the degree of exchange rate misalignment increases, informed traders lose confi-
dence in their predictions based on exchange rate fundamentals and it is more diﬃcult
to predict exchange rate behaviour. As Reitz et al. (2010) explain, informed traders
are forced to exit the market because the exchange rate fundamental value is unob-
servable and the only option left for them is to derive information from the recent
exchange rate realizations. When the degree of misalignment decreases, traders con-
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fidence increases encouraging them to trade more actively in the market submitting
more orders. Reitz and Taylor (2008) note that the degree of misalignment conveys
more or less information in low or high volatility periods, respectively and it is reason-
able to define traders confidence as a function of the standardized absolute exchange
rate misalignment. In addition, central bank intervention influences fundamental-
based traders confidence. From the coordination channel approach, central banks
have more privileged information in the foreign exchange market and traders confi-
dence is increased through foreign exchange intervention which send signals to the
market to stabilize speculation. These signals incorporated in orders from informed
traders stabilize the path of the exchange rate reverting it to its equilibrium level ft.
As Taylor (2004 and 2005) note, the eﬀectiveness of intervention will depend on the
degree of exchange rate misalignment. For instance, if there is a large gap between
the equilibrium value of the exchange rate and the spot exchange rate, intervention is
more eﬀective, while is there is a small misalignment traders believe that this event
is temporal reducing the positive eﬀects of foreign exchange intervention on their
confidence.
Reitz and Taylor (2008) explain that selling an undervalued currency or buying an
overvalued currency may force informed traders to exit the market as these central
bank actions send wrong signals to the market. In order to avoid this problem,
they propose an indicator of intervention that not only considers the amount of
intervention but includes the direction of intervention. This indicator of intervention
is composed by an indicator variable Dt multiplied by the amount of intervention
INTt. As the exchange rate used in this paper is equal to the domestic value of
one unit of foreign currency (i.e. US dollar), the indicator variable Dt is equal to
-1 when the US dollar is overvalued with respect to the domestic currency st > ft
and equal to +1 when the US dollar is undervalued with respect to the domestic
currency st < ft. The central bank acts in the right direction if the product DtINTt
63
is positive as sells of US dollars are consistent with an overvalued foreign currency
and purchases of US dollars are consistent with an undervalued foreign currency.
The pattern of the exchange rate is derived after combining equations (2.2.1) to
(2.2.11):
st+1 = st + '(st   st 1) +  wt(ft   st) +  (it   i⇤t )  (  +  t) + ut+1 (2.2.12)
where ' = aMaU > 0,  = aMaI > 0,   = aM(bU + bI) is ambiguous,   = aM( U +
 I) > 0,  = aM(dU + dI) is diﬀerent than zero and ut+1 is a composite of "t+1, ⌘Ut+1
and ⌘It+1. Under the presence of misalignments, the weight factor wt determines a
nonlinear mean reverting process of the exchange rate towards its fundamental value.
If wt is close to one the gap between the fundamental value of the exchange rate and
the spot exchange rate is small. If this gap increases informed traders are forced to
exit the market and in that case is when the central bank through foreign exchange
intervention fixes the lack of market coordination increasing the level of confidence
of fundamentalists-based traders.
2.3 Empirical Methodology
2.3.1 The STR-GARCH-M Model
There is an extensive literature on nonlinearities in real exchange rate adjustment
that could arise from diﬀerent factors such as transaction costs. Drawing on earlier
work on these theoretical models, some studies model real exchange rate adjustment
as discontinuous with two diﬀerent regimes, the mean reverting and non-mean re-
verting states, modelled as a two-threshold model. Recent works have developed
theoretical models where the mean reverting behaviour of real exchange rates is
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smooth between a given number of regimes. Overall, all these models suggest that if
the real exchange rate is more further away from the equilibrium level, the process
will become increasingly mean-reverting.
In order to find empirical evidence of the microstructural model described in
the previous section, I use a Smooth Transition Regression GARCH in mean (STR-
GARCH-M) framework that models nonlinearities in the conditional mean of ex-
change rate returns and a time-varying conditional variance. This empirical approach
belongs to the group of models developed by Terasvirta (1994), Terasvirta (1998)
and Lundbergh and Terasvirta (1998). The STR-GARCH-M model applied in this
paper allows a nonlinear pattern of exchange rate returns with switches smoothly
between a non-mean reverting to a mean reverting regime that depends on the degree
of exchange rate misalignment and the role played by foreign exchange intervention.
Although the class of nonlinear models is extensive, I choose an STR-GARCH model
as benchmark model because allows a smooth transition behaviour between regimes
due to the properties of the transition function chosen. As suggested by Terasvirta
(1994) and Dumas (1992), under the presence of heterogeneous agents is more likely
that the adjustment between regimes follows a smooth rather than discrete process.
Then, a smooth adjustment goes in line with the theoretical model described in the
previous section. However, alternative models might be considered. For instance,
the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model (Tong, 1990) and the floor and ceiling
Pesaran and Poter (1997) model with discrete switching between regimes. In addi-
tion, a Markov-switching model with endogenous transition probabilities following
Taylor (1994). Although these models are useful to model non linearities, they imply
a sharp regime switch that is too restrictive in a world with heterogeneous informed
and uninformed traders.
Following Terasvirta (1998) and Lundbergh and Terasvirta (1998), the standard
STR-GARCH model has a conditional mean with the following structure:
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yt = '’xt + f(xt;✓) + "t (2.3.1)
where ' = ('0,'1, ....,'m)0 is the vector of parameters of the linear part of the
model and xt = (1, yt 1, ..., yt m; u1t, ..., ukt)0 is the vector of explanatory variables
composed by the lag vector of the dependent variable yt and a vector of exogenous
variables ut0. Function f(xt;✓) is nonlinear and is equal to the product of a transition
function wn(st; , c) of order n and a linear combination of explanatory variables xt.








,  > 0, c1  ....  cn (2.3.2)
where the transition variable st can be part of xt and usually is equal to st = yt d
but other variables such as st = t may be used;   is a slope parameter; d is a
delay parameter; and c = (c1, ..., cn)0 is a location vector. This transition function
is bounded between a and 1, with 0  a  1/2 which allows the dependent variable
yt to switch between regimes in a smooth and continuous pattern depending on the
transition variable st. Function f(xt;✓) with ✓ = ( 0, , c0)0 is equal to:
f(xt;✓) =  













where vt ⇠ nid(0, 1), ht = h(xt,',✓,⌘) = ⌘0zt does not depend on vt, ⌘ =
(↵0,↵1, ...↵q,  1, ...,  p)0, zt = (1, "2t 1, ..., "2t q, ht 1, ..., ht p)0 where ht > 0, makes
the model described in equation (2.3.1) a STR-GARCH(p,q) model. In order to
avoid a negative variance, the parameters of vector ⌘ should follow the following
restrictions ↵0 > 0,↵j   0, j = 1, ..., q  1,↵q > 0,  j   0, j = 1, ..., p. The errors are
assumed to be normal only for inference purposes as in Lundbergh and Terasvirta
(1998). An important prerequisite of the STR part of the model is the stationarity of
the dependent variable, and specifically of the transition variable. The STR model is
built under the assumption of weak stationarity of the underlying process. In order
that this assumption holds, it is necessary that the model is stable which is possible
when there is convergence of the diﬀerent paths of realizations to a stationary point
captured by the dynamic of the transition variable. The assumption of stationarity
is necessary to maintain the standard asymptotic distributions of LM-type linearity
tests. For instance, applying linearity tests under the presence of a unit root in the
dependent variable and the transition variable may lead to incorrect inferences using
standard  2 critical values.
Following this general description of STR-GARCH models type, the empirical
model of the microstructural approach developed in the previous section consist of
a STR-GARCH-M model as follows:
4st =   + '4st 1 +  wt(ft d   st d; intt 1; ;ht d)(ft 1   st 1)
+ (it 1   i⇤t 1) + 
p
ht + "t
w(ft d   st d; intt 1; ;ht d) = exp( ( 1    2intt 1)(| ft d   st d | /
p
ht d))
1 + exp( ( 1    2intt 1)(| ft d   st d | /
p
ht d))





where 4st is the change in the logarithm of the spot exchange rate; wt is the transi-
tion function that depends on the level of intervention and the absolute standardized
level of misalignment; intt is a measure of intervention calculated as the product of
an indicator variable Dt and the amount of intervention INTt;  1 and  2 are the
transition parameters that govern the rate of transition between the non-mean re-
verting and mean reverting regimes;
p
ht captures the time-varying risk; and ht is
the conditional variance. Unlike Reitz and Taylor (2008), I include the conditional
variance directly into the conditional mean to obtain the STR-GARCH-M model.
The conditional volatility ht for each of the exchange rates vis-a-vis the US dollar is
modeled as a GARCH(1,1) according to the Box-Jenkins approach. The first-order
GARCH model is commonly found in the literature of exchange rate determination,
and as Lundbergh and Terasvirta (1998) explain, that lag is modeled as greater than
one only if necessary. The form of the logistic transition function wt is chosen ac-
cording to De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006) that model a similar transition
function for uninformed and informed traders. In addition, the transition variable
chosen is a linear combination of the fundamental and current value of the exchange
rate | ft d   st d | given the impact of exchange rate misalignments on the level of
traders confidence.
2.3.2 Specification, Estimation and Evaluation
Following Lundbergh and Terasvirta (1998) that proposed a procedure to estimate
the STAR-GARCH class model, this paper uses a two-stage estimation strategy
which specifies the conditional mean first, and then the conditional variance. I carry
out the estimations as a series of single country regressions. The general rule of
estimation consists of initially choosing the maximum lag length to specify a linear
autoregressive model. There are two general approaches for determining the appro-
priate autoregressive order. First, the partial autocorrelation function (PACF), and
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second the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian information
criterion (SBIC). In addition to these criteria, I use a residual autocorrelation test
to avoid omitted autocorrelation according to Terasvirta (1994). This test is based
on the Ljung Box-Q statistic for the estimated residuals of the selected autoregres-
sive model. Second, I test the null hypothesis of linearity of the conditional mean
  = 0 in equation (2.3.1) against the alternative of a nonlinear STR model according
to Granger and Terasvirta (1993) and Lundbergh and Terasvirta (1998). I use a
LM-type test according to Terasvirta (1994) where the null hypothesis is a linear
AR model and the alternative is a logistic STR model of order n. As the transition
function is not identified, I approximate equation (2.3.3) using a Taylor expansion
around   = 0. Assuming d  m without loss of generality and setting the transition
variable equal to | ft d   st d |, I apply the linearity test for diﬀerent d values, and
for each value I test the hypothesis   = 0. This test assumes constant conditional
variance with an asymptotic  2 distribution. However, I use the F-version of the
test according to Granger and Terasvirta (1993) as it has better small sample prop-
erties. If the null hypothesis of linearity is rejected, I select the delay parameter d
for the STR model with the rule of minimum p-value of the F linearity test. Ini-
tially, I assume that the transition function is not identified to perform the linearity
test. However, I do not test if the model adjust better to the logistic or exponential
STR model as I choose the transition function specified in (2.2.10) according to De
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006).
I estimate the conditional mean assuming that the conditional variance is not
time-varying and then test the hypothesis of ARCH eﬀects in the error process using
the Engle (1982) LM-test or the McLeod and Li (1983) test. The Engle Lagrange
multiplier test is based on the autocorrelation of the squared residuals and it is
asymptotically distributed as  2q when the null hypothesis of no ARCH eﬀects is
true. The McLeod and Li test is asymptotically equivalent to the Engle LM-test an
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it is commonly used as a diagnostic on the standardised squared residuals to test
ARCH eﬀects. This test is based on the Ljung-Box test and evaluate if the first p
autocorrelations for the squared residuals are small in magnitude. Under the null
hypothesis of no ARCH eﬀects, the test statistic is asymptotically distributed as  2p.
If there is evidence of heteroskedasticity, I assume that the conditional variance is
parametrized as a standard GARCH model. Finally, I estimate the STR-GARCH
model specification and run diﬀerent misspecification tests to check the adequacy of
the model. This involve testing against remaining serial dependence in the condi-
tional mean and the conditional variance using a LM test for the residuals and the
squared standardised errors, respectively.
In addition, I use the BDS statistic (Brock et al., 1996) to test the null hypothesis
of independence and identically distributed standardised errors. The BDS test is
nonparametric and is derived from the correlation integral which measures the spatial
correlation of all possible pairs of m consecutive points. The BDS test statistic is
asymptotically N(0, 1) under the null hypothesis. In this paper, I have used the
procedure BDSTEST in RATS to compute the asymptotic values of the test statistic.
One of the advantages of this test is that does not require the existence of high-order
moments in contrast to most alternative tests. In addition, the BDS test has a
high power against a vast class of alternative models if the sample is suﬃciently
large (i.e. sample sizes of 500 or more). However, one of the disadvantages is that
the asymptotic distribution of the test is invariant under some specific conditions
when a GARCH process is used to pre-filter the data (de Lima 1996). Moreover,
considering the GARCH standardised errors tend to under-reject the null hypothesis
due to nuisance parameter eﬀects. De Lima (1996) addresses this issue using a log-
transformation of the squared standardised residuals. In addition, this problem may
be solved using techniques such as response surface analysis to mitigate the size bias.
In this paper, I evaluate the test using the standardised errors. Finally, I use the
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likelihood ratio test to evaluate restrictions in the parameters.
It is noteworthy to mention that as in Lundbergh and Terasvirta (1998), I esti-
mate all parameters simultaneously. The advantage of using the two-stage estimation
procedure is to get appropriate initial values to get convergence in the joint estima-
tion of the conditional mean and variance. In addition, I impose the non-negativity
constraints in the GARCH model to avoid a negative conditional variance. As in
Reitz et al. (2010), I use robust standard errors in my estimations using the BFGS
algorithm. This is because the transition function used is a linear transformation
of the general transition function suggested by Terasvirta and Anderson (1992) and
that aﬀects the assumption of conditional normality in the residuals. Terasvirta
(1994) explains the convergence problems derived from nonlinear optimization, and
suggest to standardize the transition variable by dividing it by the sample standard
deviation for LSTAR models. The STR-GARCH-M model suggested in this paper
is consistent with that approach as I scale the transition variable in the logistic func-
tion by dividing it by the conditional standard deviation. This is useful for selecting
appropriate starting values for the slope parameters  1 and  2 .
2.4 Data Description
I use daily data on bilateral spot exchange rates vis-a-vis the US dollar and daily
foreign exchange intervention in Brazil (BRL), Chile (CLP), Colombia (COP), Mex-
ico (MXN) and Peru (PEN) between January 3, 2000 and December 30, 2013. The
exchange rate is the domestic price of one unit of foreign currency which means
that an increase (decrease) in the bilateral exchange rate implies a depreciation (ap-
preciation) of the domestic currency against the US dollar. Exchange rate returns
are calculated as the first diﬀerence of the log of the bilateral spot exchange rate
multiplied by 100. In addition, I use the overnight interest rate on deposits in each
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country and the eﬀective federal funds rate for the US to construct the interest rate
diﬀerential.1Exchange rates, foreign exchange intervention and domestic overnight
interest rates are taken from Central Bank sources while the US federal funds rate
is taken from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). Figures B.1 and B.2
describe the pattern of bilateral exchange rates vis-a-vis the US dollar and exchange
rate returns, respectively. Table C.1 provide descriptive statistics of daily exchange
rate returns. Means are close to zero for all countries at daily frequency. There is
evidence of right skewed distribution in all returns which suggests more episodes of
currency appreciation with extreme values related to currency depreciation. In addi-
tion, there is evidence of excess kurtosis in all currencies suggesting non-normalities
in the data. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to the log of the exchange rate do not
reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity while it does reject the null hypothesis
of unit root in exchange rate returns in all countries.
The data analyzed in this paper corresponds to the flexible exchange rate regime
period in these economies. According to the IMF (2013) report on de facto ex-
change rate arrangements, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru are under a floating
exchange rate regime while Chile is under free floating. However, their exchange rate
regimes can not be considered as purely floating as central banks in these emerging
economies have actively intervened in the foreign exchange market during the last
decade. Foreign exchange intervention has diﬀerent motives but the main objective
of foreign exchange policies in theses economies is to maintain an appropriate level
of foreign reserves for precautionary or competitiveness reasons and to reduce the
excessive exchange rate volatility in the short run. I study only the flexible exchange
rate arrangement period for two reasons. First, the availability of information on
foreign exchange intervention is limited before the adoption of a floating exchange
rate framework. Second, the dynamic of central bank intervention is diﬀerent un-
1The interest rate diﬀerential is divided by 360 as the information used is on a daily basis.
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der a fixed exchange rate regime as the nominal anchor is the exchange rate and
monetary policy and foreign exchange policy are aimed to achieve an exchange rate
target range or value. For instance, during the late 1990’s Brazil, Colombia and
Chile adopted a crawling band system to the US dollar and when the exchange rate
was approaching to the ceiling or the floor of the pre-announced band the Central
Bank intervened actively in the foreign exchange market to revert the exchange rate
to a pre-established exchange rate level or range.
The current monetary policy in these economies is independent of foreign ex-
change policies as the main objective of central banks is to achieve the inflation
target. However, monetary authorities intervene in the foreign exchange market
using diﬀerent mechanisms such as discretional intervention or pre-announced pro-
grams of purchases and/or sales of foreign exchange.2For instance, Colombia has
used foreign exchange intervention based rules and discretional intervention, while
Chile and Mexico have always relied on rules. Brazil and Peru have not used rules
of intervention and when it is necessary, they intervene in the spot and forward
exchange market. I aggregate all types of intervention in one measure by country as-
suming that each instrument has similar eﬀects on exchange rates. This assumption
takes into consideration the findings of the recent literature that the eﬀectiveness
of interventions does not depend on whether intervention is of the rule-based type
or discretionary (IMF 2011a). The fact that publicly announced intervention opera-
tions are required under the coordination channel approach makes worth it to study
if discretional intervention has any coordination role in the foreign exchange market.
I select the case of Colombia in the robustness checks section and I leave for future
research the analysis of the coordination role played by each type of intervention in
the other countries. Figure 2.1 describes the pattern of intervention and bilateral ex-
change rates in each country, and Table C.2 provide descriptive statistics on central
2The appendix has a detailed description of the diﬀerent mechanisms of intervention by country.
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bank intervention.
Figure 2.1: Central Banks Foreign Exchange Intervention and Bilateral Nominal
Exchange Rates
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From Figure 2.1, I can infer that central bank foreign exchange intervention
was of leaning against the wind type in diﬀerent episodes of the period analyzed,
especially during periods of exchange rate appreciation. Table C.2 shows that Chile
has not intervened actively in the foreign exchange market between 2000 and 2013
with only 12% of central bank intervention of the total of trading days, while Brazil
has intervened actively in the market with 99% of intervention of the total trading
days. As the IMF (2011a) explains it is quite diﬃcult to classify some operations
used by the Central Bank of Mexico as foreign exchange intervention. This is due to
the nature of the diﬀerent mechanisms used. An important part of the information
used for Mexico corresponds to option auctions. In addition, the size of intervention
in Brazil is the result of an active and permanent presence not only in the spot
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market. The intervention in the derivative market has been crucial in aﬀecting the
level of exchange rate as Kohlscheen and Andrade (2013) state.
As Kamil (2008) notes, studying diﬀerent episodes of intervention gives an indi-
cation of the stance of monetary policy and an ideal context in inflation targeting
economies to study the interaction between monetary policy and exchange rate pol-
icy. Consistency between policies is one the requirements to have a credible inflation
targeting regime. It is noteworthy to mention that the eﬀectiveness of intervention
may depend on the consistency between such policies. However, the aim of this pa-
per is to analyze the coordinating role played by foreign exchange intervention and
not the mechanism through which that intervention is more or less eﬀective due to
the consistency in policy decisions. Figure B.3 describes the pattern of central bank
intervention and the monetary policy rate in each country. I can infer from Figure
B.3 that these economies adopted a loose monetary policy after the recent financial
crisis consistent with purchases of foreign currency. However, such consistency is less
clear in the early 2000s.
I use the purchasing power parity level based on relative consumer prices between
the US and each country to measure the exchange rate equilibrium level ft in the
baseline model. This measure follows the methodology of Reitz and Taylor (2008)
as it is broadly accepted by foreign exchange market participants as a correct long
relationship. I assume that the PPP holds in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and
Peru. This may be a strong assumption but the main objective of this paper is to
find evidence that foreign exchange intervention has a coordinating role rather than
find evidence of the PPP validity. Nevertheless, assuming that PPP holds is not far
from Central Banks projections of the long-run fundamental value. For instance, the
Central Bank of Colombia use as a proxy for the fundamental value of the exchange
rate the average of diﬀerent models based on the PPP, the Hodrick-Prescott filter,
and structural VEC methodologies.
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I use monthly observations of the consumer price indices for the US and each
emerging economy to calculate the fundamental PPP value of the exchange rate as
ft = log(CPIdt )   log(CPIUSt ), where log(CPIdt ) and log(CPIUSt ) are the log of
the CPI in the domestic economy (i.e. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru)
and the log of the CPI in the US, respectively. This information is taken from
the IMF International Financial Statistics database with 2005 as the base year. As
Reitz and Taylor (2008) explain, one problem of this PPP fundamental measure
is that consumer price indices are only available on a monthly basis while all the
other variables used in the model are at a daily frequency. However, they explain
that assuming that the PPP measure is valid for the whole month is compatible
with market participants behaviour as their daily trading for the whole month is
based on the latest published CPI. As the real exchange rate is assumed to be mean
reverting, I normalize the log real exchange rate subtracting its mean value for the
whole period. This implies that at some point in the sample the log real exchange
rate is approximately equal to zero and there are no deviations from the PPP.
Figure 2.2 describes the pattern of the log nominal exchange rate and the PPP
fundamental value in each country. The period analyzed in this paper includes
important episodes that aﬀected the dynamics of exchange rates and foreign exchange
intervention. According to Figure 2.2, deviations from the PPP fundamental are
characterized by two important periods in these economies. With the exception of
Mexico, the first half of the 2000s is distinguished by an undervaluation of domestic
currencies vis-a-vis the US dollar, while between late 2009 and 2013 there has been
a domestic currency overvaluation. The first period coincides with the 9/11 attacks
in 2001 that destabilized the US economy, and two important events in the region.
The financial and the foreign exchange crisis in Argentina between 2000 and 2002,
and then the currency crisis in Brazil in late 2002 due to political instability that
increased exchange rate volatility with the Brazilian real (R$) reaching an historical
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Figure 2.2: Log Nominal Exchange Rates and PPP Fundamental Value
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level of R$4 per US$1. The period of overvaluation experienced between late 2009
and 2013 coincides with the stabilization of global markets and the recovery of capital
flows between 2010 and 2012 to levels seen before the crisis. The literature on capital
flows in emerging economies finds that one of the main factors driving the post-crisis
foreign exchange appreciation is the recovery of capital inflows. However, as Nechio
(2014) explains, it is worth noting that both Fed tapering news in early 2013 and
country’s domestic conditions have played an important role in slowing the pace of
capital inflows in emerging economies. According to De Gregorio (2011), the post-
crisis global economy adjustment has international eﬀects in emerging economies,
and the exchange rate is one of the variables that adjust in the process. The increase
in capital inflows jointly with other global and domestic factors have aﬀected the pace
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of domestic currency appreciation. This makes necessary the adoption of additional
policies such as foreign exchange intervention. De Gregorio (2011) explains that
although foreign exchange intervention, either rule-based or discretionary has only
temporary eﬀects, it mitigates the exchange rate adjustment process. These motives
for intervention under diﬀerent episodes of exchange rate misalignment are reflected
in figures 2.1, 2.2 and B.3, and I now turn to the empirical analysis of the coordination
role played by this intervention to mitigate the adjustment process of the exchange
rate.
2.5 Estimation Results
The AIC and SBIC accompanied by the Ljung Box-Q statistic suggest that the
first lag is the appropriate order of the linear autoregressive model of exchange rate
returns in Brazil, Chile and Colombia, while in Mexico and Peru the data adjusts
to an autoregressive model of order two. Table C.3 reports the p-values of the F
linearity test for diﬀerent values of the delay parameter d. The null hypothesis tested
is linearity of the conditional mean under the assumption of a constant conditional
variance. I use the absolute exchange rate misalignment as the transition variable
according to the theoretical model described in Section 2.2. The results indicate
nonlinearities in the model and justify the formulation of a STR model as the p-
values for all the diﬀerent values of the delay parameter are smaller than the 1%
significance level which implies a rejection of the null hypothesis of linearity. For
instance, the transition variable selected for Brazil and Peru is | ft 3   st 3 |with a
delay parameter of d = 3 , while for Colombia and Mexico is | ft 1   st 1 |with a
delay parameter d = 1 . The null hypothesis of linearity is barely rejected for Chile
at 10% significance level which is not conclusive about the evidence of nonlinearities
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in exchange rate returns. 3
I estimate the conditional mean of exchange rate returns assuming a constant
conditional variance after determining the appropriate autoregressive lag and the
appropriate delay parameter of the transition variable. After scaling the transition
variable by the conditional variance, I fix the initial values of the slope parameters
 1 and  2 equal to 1 and 0, respectively. This procedure follows Terasvirta (1994)
and makes it easier to reach convergence in the nonlinear model. Table C.4 reports
the results of the tests of no linear ARCH against ARCH eﬀects in the residuals.
The tests reported are asymptotically distributed  2and are evaluated at diﬀerent
lags. As the calculated value of the 2statistic is greater than the critical value for
all lags, the hypothesis of no ARCH is rejected in all cases using the Engle LM-Test
and the McLeod and Li Test . This confirms the existence of heteroskedasticity in
the residuals and suggests that it is appropriate to estimate a STR-GARCH model
where the conditional variance follows a GARCH (1,1) process.
The parameter estimates of the STR-GARCH-M model are described in Table
2.1. The results are similar in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Although for
Chile convergence is attained in the estimation of the STR-GARCH-M model, the
slope parameters in the transition function are not even significant at the 10% level.
It is plausible that the lack of evidence of a nonlinear influence of foreign exchange
intervention through the coordination channel in Chile may be related to the fact
that during the period analyzed the Central Bank of Chile did not actively intervene
in the foreign exchange market, and the model is unable to capture the eﬀectiveness
of intervention via that channel. For instance, foreign exchange intervention in Chile
3As Taylor et al. (2001) note, economic intuition indicates small values of the delay parameter
as it is unlikely that exchange rates will take long time to revert to the equilibrium. However, as in
Reitz et al. (2010), I choose the appropriate delay parameter that gives the smallest p-value of the
linearity test. Using a delay parameter equal to one does not change substantially the estimated
coeﬃcients and their significance.
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Table 2.1: Parameter Estimates of the STR-GARCH-M Models
82
was only active for a short period between 2001 and 2003 through discretional
interventions, and in 2008 and 2011 through pre-announced programs of foreign ex-
change purchases. 4However, this result does not imply the absence of a coordination
channel in Chile. It may indicate that the coordination role of central bank inter-
vention could be seen as an extension of the signaling channel traditionally modeled
using a linear framework.
I test restrictions on the parameters to check the validity of the introduction
of chartist and fundamentalist trading analysis and the importance of intervention
in increasing traders confidence in the market. The restrictions imposed on the
coeﬃcients are   =   =  =  =  1 =  2 = 0 which implies a restricted model equal
to an AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model. The results of the LRT test reported in Table
2.1 indicate that the constrained model is rejected in favor of the STR-GARCH-M
model at the 1% significance level in Brazil and Peru, and at the 5% in Colombia
and Mexico. There is no evidence for Chile that the STR-GARCH-M model is an
appropriate representation of exchange rate returns.
The coeﬃcients in all countries without considering Chile are significant and
with the expected signs according to the description of the theoretical model. Unlike
Reitz et al. (2010), the coeﬃcient of the uninformed traders '1 is positive and
significant which explains that chartist analysis plays an important role in exchange
rate determination in these economies. The coeﬃcient '2 is also significant in Mexico
and Peru. However, the positive sign and significant coeﬃcient  in Brazil, Colombia
and Peru reveals the importance of fundamentalist trading that relies on the analysis
of exchange rate deviations from its fundamental value. Although  is negative and
significant at the 1% level in Mexico, intervention still has a coordination role. A
negative reaction coeﬃcient  may suggest that traders adopt contrarian strategies
in the market. As this coeﬃcient is assumed to be exogenous in the theoretical
4Details on the mechanisms of intervention in Chile are described in the Appendix.
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model, I leave for future research the fact that this parameter may be endogenous to
other factors that are not incorporated in this model. For instance, the Central Bank
of Mexico adopted extraordinary auctions during 2008 due to the high turbulence
in the foreign exchange market and it may be interesting to analyze if the market
reaction coeﬃcient could be aﬀected by unexpected foreign exchange policies and
periods of liquidity stress in the foreign exchange market.5
The coeﬃcients of the interest rate diﬀerential are all negative and significant at
1% level in Brazil, 5% in Peru, and 10% in Mexico. This results suggests that an
increase in the domestic interest rate relative to the interest rate in the US appreciates
the domestic currency. As Reitz and Taylor (2008) and Reitz et al. (2010) note, this
results may be consistent with the existence of carry trade. For instance, foreign
investors in the last two years have noted that Colombia and Brazil are oﬀering the
best returns in the world to carry trade investors and the data may be capturing
this fact.
The coeﬃcients related to the constant part of the risk premium   are significant
and positive in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, while  is negative and significant in
all countries except for Peru. This gives evidence of a time-varying risk premium
in these countries. The negative coeﬃcient implies that when risk increases, the
rate of depreciation of the domestic currency decreases. This is consistent with the
modern portfolio theory.6As investors usually get a higher return for riskier assets,
an increase in risk that causes less depreciation of the domestic currency implies that
investors demand a higher expected return of holding that currency.
The slope parameters  1 and  2 are significant at the 1% level in all countries with
larger coeﬃcients in Brazil and Mexico. As the parameter  1 conveys information
about the speed of transition between the mean reverting and non-mean reverting
5Details on the mechanisms of intervention in Mexico are described in the Appendix.
6The modern portfolio theory explains how investment diversification in a pool of assets could
maximize the expected return of that portfolio given a level of risk or minimizing its risk assuming
that the level of the expected return is given.
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regimes, a larger coeﬃcient suggest that fundamentalists-based traders confidence
is more susceptible to deviations of the exchange rate from its fundamental value.
If the exchange rate is increasingly misaligned, its impact on confidence is more
destabilizing in the foreign exchange markets of Brazil and Mexico than in Colombia
and Peru, and traders are forced to exit the market more quickly in those economies.
The significance and positive sign of  2 indicates that foreign exchange intervention
through its coordination role fixes the lack of confidence present in the market due
to the degree of exchange rate misalignment. The stabilizing role of intervention
although is significant in Colombia, it is stronger in Brazil and Mexico and negligible
in Peru.7
It is noteworthy to analyze the case of Peru as it is one of the most dollarized
economies in Latin America. Although it has been under an on-going de-dollarization
process there is still an important share of credit and deposits denominated in dollars
in the banking sector. According to the Central Reserve Bank of Peru the degree
of financial dollarization in the private sector reached 54 percent in 2006 that is
considerably lower to the 2000 level of 72 percent. Inflation targeting adopted in 2002
has played an important role in reducing financial dollarization. The literature notes
the relatively high stability of both the nominal and real exchange rates in Peru (i.e.
Acosta and Coble, 2011). This may be related to the fact that monetary authorities
have fear of floating as movements in the exchange rate have substantial eﬀects in
the economy, especially in the banking system where an important percentage of
debtors receive income in domestic currency but have to pay their debt in foreign
currency. Although exchange rate misalignments notably aﬀect traders confidence
in Peru, the limited eﬀect of central bank intervention in terms of the coordination
channel may be the result of the degree of dollarization. This makes diﬃcult for the
central bank to fix the lack of confidence in the market as traders may perceive that
7Diﬀerent starting values were used in the estimations and all the results report a non significant
coeﬃcient  2 for Peru and close to zero.
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the policy rate could be more eﬀective in stabilizing exchange rate fluctuations than
actual interventions. Although Peru is under an IT, the central bank uses the policy
rate to control inflation through changes in the policy rate but indirectly controls
fluctuations in the foreign exchange market to maintain a stable exchange rate in a
dollarized economy.
There is no remaining serial autocorrelation and no remaining ARCH structure
in the residuals. The hypothesis of independence and identically distributed errors
is not rejected according to the BDS test as the p-values are greater than the 5%
significance level, with the exception of Chile. Finally, I report unit root tests of
the transition variable | ft d   st d | in order to check if this variable is eﬀectively
rendering the model balanced. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test does reject the null
hypothesis of unit root of the transition variable in all countries at the 5% significance
level with a critical value of -2.862. As the degree of misalignment captured in the
transition variable conveys more or less information in low or high volatility periods,
respectively, scaling this variable by the sample standard deviation is useful to attain
model convergence, and may reinforce the rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root
of the transition variable.
2.6 Robustness Checks
An appropriate measure of intervention is fundamental in any type of model of ex-
change rate determination. The literature on the coordination channel approach
usually considers the actual amount of intervention without analyzing the direction.
As I outlined in the description of the theoretical model and according to Reitz and
Taylor (2008), considering the direction of intervention is important as selling (buy-
ing) an undervalued (overvalued) currency may confuse informed traders. In order to
distinguish between the eﬀects of intervention under these two measures, I introduce
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the amount of intervention regardless of the direction in the transition function of
the benchmark model and compare the results with the estimations obtained in the
previous section. Table C.5 reports the parameter estimates using the amount of
intervention regardless of the direction. The results show that the slope parameters
 1 and  2, although still significant are lower in magnitude in Brazil, Colombia and
Mexico. In Chile, although these parameters are statistically significant, the coeﬃ-
cient on the transition function  is not significant which does not give conclusive
evidence about the nonlinear influence of foreign exchange intervention. In general,
the robustness estimations reveal that the benchmark model is more accurate in
modelling traders behaviour as accounting for the direction of intervention avoid the
loss of information in the trading process.
Foreign exchange intervention is eﬀective under the coordination channel ap-
proach if agents in the market are well informed about the amount of intervention.
As discretional intervention is not publicly disclosed on the day of the operations, I
expect that it has a small eﬀect on traders confidence when there are large exchange
rate misalignments. If a central bank intervenes actively in a discretional form,
traders may recognize its presence in the market through the electronic trading sys-
tem that is frequently used by central banks. Although traders could inform to the
market about central bank operations, the coordination role of intervention may be
diminished as only a part of the information related to these operations would be
immediately available. Thus, I select Colombia as a special case to study the eﬀects
of diﬀerent types of intervention as it is the only country that has well-diﬀerentiated
periods of intervention.8Table C.6 reports the results of the STR-GARCH-M model
for Colombia diﬀerentiating by type of intervention. As the sub-sample periods es-
timated have few observations, I restrict the coeﬃcients  and  1 to the values of
the benchmark model in order to achieve convergence. The parameter estimate  2
8Details on the mechanisms of intervention in Colombia are described in the Appendix.
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is significant for all types of intervention and it has the expected positive sign, with
the exception of discretional intervention. As I expected, discretional intervention
has not a positive impact on traders confidence on the day of intervention. However,
the coordination channel could work after some days when the market learn all the
information related to central bank operations.
2.7 Conclusions and Future Research
This paper analyses the coordination role of central bank foreign exchange rate in-
tervention in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. The literature in these
countries has focused in the signaling and portfolio channels neglecting the existence
of nonlinearities in the pattern of exchange rates. The theoretical framework used
in this paper relies on a model of risk averse uninformed and informed traders that
submit orders according to their believes of the recent trend of exchange rates and
exchange rate misalignments, respectively. This model studies nonlinearities in ex-
change rate mean reversion where intervention increases traders confidence in order
to conduct the exchange rate to a stable path. Unlike the existent literature, I in-
clude a time-varying risk premia as an important factor that explains exchange rate
behaviour in emerging economies.
The empirical evidence from the STR-GARCH-M model reveals that foreign ex-
change intervention has a coordination role that fixes the lack of traders confidence in
Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. For instance, traders reduce their confidence in fun-
damentals if the exchange rate is largely misaligned but foreign exchange intervention
increases their confidence encouraging them to re-enter the market. Although ex-
change rate misalignments in Peru aﬀect traders confidence, the role of intervention
is diminished due to the degree of financial dollarization. There is no evidence of
nonlinearities of the exchange rate in Chile and a stabilizing role of foreign exchange
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intervention that may be the result of the lack of central bank intervention during
the period analyzed. However, the coordination role of foreign exchange intervention
in Chile could be seen as an extension of the signaling channel extensively studied by
the existing literature. In addition, there is evidence of a time-varying risk premia
that reduces the pace of depreciation in all countries as investors demand a higher
return of holding the domestic currency.
The magnitude and significance of the coeﬃcient of intervention are diminished
when the model is re-estimated using a measure of intervention regardless of the
direction. The use of a measure that takes into consideration the direction of inter-
vention sends more clear messages to the market about the objectives of intervention.
In addition, discretional intervention does not have an impact on traders confidence
on the day when operations are performed. However, the positive eﬀect of interven-
tion in stabilizing exchange rates may take some time until the market learn all the
information related to central bank operations.
As the literature evidence the high degree of correlation between the foreign ex-
change markets in these countries, modelling spatial dependences or using a panel
STR-GARCH model to exploit the heterogeneity in these markets may be a chal-
lenging but a promising topic for future research.
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Appendix
A. Mechanisms of Intervention by Country
Brazil
There are diﬀerent mechanisms of intervention in Brazil: spot market intervention,
currency swap auctions, forward intervention, repurchase lines and foreign currency
loans. As repurchase lines and foreign currency loans were used temporally during
the foreign currency crisis in 2002 and the recent financial crisis between 2008 and
2009, I only include in this paper spot intervention and swap interventions through
auctions as they are the most active mechanisms of intervention used by the central
bank. Although currency swap auctions do not change the level of international
reserves, Kohlscheen and Andrade (2013) has found that they have a direct impact
in the level of exchange rate through the change in the supply of hedging instruments
that aﬀects the demand for USD dollars. This is the main reason to include this
type of intervention in my analysis. Nascimento and Ribeiro (2011) explain that
the central bank of Brazil intervenes depending on the characteristics and trends of
the foreign exchange market. For instance, after the adoption of a flexible exchange
rate regime in 1999, the central bank used more actively spot intervention, while
foreign exchange swaps were more actively used during the foreign exchange crisis
in late 2002. After 2005, the main objective of the foreign exchange policy was to
increase international reserves and moderate the eﬀects of the US dollar on the foreign
exchange market through spot interventions. During the recent financial crisis and
between 2011 and 2012 the central bank decided to intervene in the market using
more actively currency swap auctions rather than spot intervention in order to limit
the Brazilian Real depreciation experienced during these periods. As Brazil has a
developed swap market, the central bank determined that was convenient to use
these instruments to stabilize the pattern of the exchange rate.
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Chile
After the adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime in September 1999, the cen-
tral bank of Chile decided to intervene in the foreign exchange market only under
exceptional circumstances. On August 16, 2001 the monetary authority announced
an scheme of intervention through foreign exchange sales in the spot market and
auctions of central bank bonds denominated in US dollars (BCD). This decision was
due to the higher volatility of the Chilean Peso as a result of the diﬃcult economic
situation in some countries in the region such as Argentina, and the negative fore-
casts of the global economic performance. The amount of sterilized intervention
had a limit of US$2 billion of the international reserves to finance foreign exchange
sales in order to moderate the exchange rate volatility, but without targeting an
exchange rate level. The period of intervention was extended until the end of 2001.
The foreign currency crisis in Brazil in 2002 accelerated the pace of depreciation of
the Chilean Peso forcing the central bank to announce in October 2002 the adop-
tion of a similar scheme of intervention to the one adopted in 2001. This program
would be extended until early 2003. However, spot intervention was not used during
that period and only bonds denominated in US dollars were sold. Although trans-
parency in the amount of intervention increased after the foreign exchange band was
eliminated, the central bank did not announce the daily amount of intervention in
2001. The market only could know that there was spot intervention, the maximum
amount of international reserves used for that purpose and the only proxy available
for the amount of intervention were the movements of international reserves. On
April 10, 2008 the central bank announced foreign exchange purchases for US$50
million between April 14 and September 29, 2008. In 2011, the central bank an-
nounced a program of foreign exchange purchases for US$12 billion performed with
daily purchases of US$50 million between January and December 2011. The aim of
this scheme was to increase the level of international reserves to a compatible level
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of other similar emerging economies and to smooth the adjustment process of the
exchange rate.
Colombia
The central bank of Colombia has three main mechanisms of intervention in the
foreign exchange market: rule-based interventions based on options, discretionary
intervention and pre-announced daily interventions through competitive auctions.
In November 1999, the monetary authority adopted american put and call options
as an instrument of intervention in order to accumulate or deaccumulate interna-
tional reserves, and to control the exchange rate volatility. The central bank sets
discretionally the amount to be auctioned and the option exercise condition is ac-
tivated when the exchange rate is below or above its last 20 working days moving
average for reserves accumulation and deaccumulation, respectively. To control the
exchange rate volatility the central bank intervenes in the market through automatic
put and call options when the exchange rate is 4% bellow or above its last 20 work-
ing days moving average, respectively. Discretionary intervention was actively used
between 2004 and 2007 with the objective of depreciate the exchange rate. Finally,
pre-announced constant daily interventions of US$20 million were announced in June
2008 in order to increase the pace of reserve accumulation. At the present time, this
mechanism of intervention is the main instrument of the foreign exchange policy in
Colombia. However, the amount of intervention was modified in September 2010 to
be at least of US$20 million per day.
Mexico
The central Bank of Mexico has diﬀerent mechanisms of intervention. After the
peso crisis, the monetary authority adopted put options to increase the level of in-
ternational reserves. This mechanism was introduced in August 1996 and suspended
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in June 2001. Between February 1997 and June 2001, the central bank intervened
discretionally through an auction mechanism selling US dollars with daily sales of
up to US$200 million. This type of intervention was implemented as a result of the
significant exchange rate volatility, and was possible due to a significant accumula-
tion of reserves obtained through the put options mechanism. In May 2003 due to
the significant increase in international reserves, the central bank decided to sell US
dollars directly to the market and pre-announcing the amount to be sold based on
the level of reserves in the preceding quarter. This mechanism was suspended in July
2008. On October 8, 10 and 16, 2008 the central bank implemented extraordinary
auctions of US dollars due to the high volatility in the foreign exchange market. In
addition to this mechanism, auctions with a minimum price were used to provide
liquidity to the foreign exchange market between October 2008 and April 2010, and
between November 2011 and April 2013. As a result of the adverse eﬀects of the
recent financial crisis in the foreign exchange market, put options were re-introduced
in February 2010 in order to build an appropriate level of international reserves to
moderate the vulnerability of the economy to external shocks. In November 2011
this mechanism was temporally suspended and replaced by auctions with a minimum
price. As in Brazil, the Bank of Mexico used temporally a reciprocal currency agree-
ment or swap line during the recent financial crisis. However, I do not include this
measure in my estimations as it was adopted due to pressures of private institutions
to obtain dollar funding.
Peru
The central reserve bank of Peru intervenes in the foreign exchange market through
over the counter purchases or sales of USD dollars, swap operations and sales of
foreign exchange to the public sector. However, I do not include in this analysis
operations with the Treasury as they are aimed to fund external debt payments.
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Peru does not have any rule-based instruments of intervention. The central bank
intervenes actively in the market to moderate the excessive volatility of the exchange
rate, as this economy is more vulnerable to external shocks due to the higher degree of
financial dollarization. This intervention indirectly is contributing to strengthen the
international liquidity of the economy accumulating international reserves. However,
intervention in the foreign exchange market does not imply a commitment to any
exchange rate target which supports the consistency of the foreign exchange policy
with an inflation targeting framework.
B. Figures
Figure B.1: Bilateral Exchange Rates (January 2000=100)
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Figure B.2: Exchange Rate Returns
95
96




Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics of Daily Exchange Rate Returns, 2000-2013
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Table C.2: Descriptive Statistics of Daily Foreign Exchange Intervention, 2000-2013
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Table C.3: P-Values of the LM-test against Nonlinearity
Table C.4: No ARCH Tests of the STR Model with Constant Conditional Variance
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Table C.5: STR GARCH-M Models Regardless of the Direction of Intervention
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Table C.6: STR GARCH-M Model by Type of Intervention in Colombia
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Chapter 3
The Determinants of Private Capital
Flows in Emerging Economies: The
Role of Fed Unconventional
Monetary Policies
3.1 Introduction
The adoption of Unconventional Monetary Policies (UMP) in industrialized and
emerging economies have increased the interest of policymakers in studying their in-
ternational spillover eﬀects, especially on capital flows. The Federal Reserve adopted
a set of unconventional policies as an alternative to conventional measures to stimu-
late the aggregate demand at the zero lower bound and to restore the functioning of
the financial system. The change in the dynamics of capital flows during periods of
crises makes it crucial to understand its main drivers, and especially the role played
by UMP.
In this paper I study the determinants of gross private capital inflows in Emerging
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Economies (EMEs) focusing on the role of Unconventional Monetary Policies (UMP)
adopted by the Federal Reserve. Using the approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998),
the hypothesis is that the eﬀect of UMP on capital flows depends on the degree
of financial exposure of each country to the US and varies according to the type of
unconventional measure examined (e.g. Liquidity Measures, purchases of Long Term
Treasury Bonds, and purchases of Long Term Mortgage Backed Securities). If this
channel is really working, I should see the eﬀects of UMP being greatest in countries
which are more financially exposed to the US.1
The literature on the role of Fed UMP in driving capital flows has focused on
the eﬀects of announcements and actual operations, and the channels through which
these measures aﬀect the dynamics of international capital flows. This paper makes
two contributions to the existing literature. First, using a dynamic panel data ap-
proach with country fixed eﬀects and controlling for the recent financial crisis, I
identify that the impact of UMP on international capital flows is diﬀerentiated be-
tween economies and depends on the degree of financial exposure to the US. Instead
of examining UMP as part of a set of global variables as the existing literature usually
does, I am able to isolate the eﬀect of UMP on capital flows that can be confounded
with global events such as the recent financial crisis. As there is not conclusive evi-
dence regarding the post-crisis increase in capital inflows in EMEs due to Fed UMP,
this approach could be the smoking gun in this debate as I attempt to find evidence
of a specific mechanism by which these policies aﬀect capital flows in EMEs.
Second, unlike the literature on Fed UMP, I use gross private capital inflows
instead of net private capital flows and include other flows in addition to portfolio
flows. As I want to analyze the impact of UMP adopted in the US on all capital
1Rajan and Zingales (1998) study the impact of external financing on economic growth tak-
ing into consideration within-country diﬀerences as they estimate a model where the dependence
on external financing varies by industry and the financial development varies by country. After
correcting for country and fixed eﬀects, they find that the relationship between external financial
dependence and economic growth is positive.
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flows in EMEs, I analyze the dynamics of capital flows from the foreign investor
perspective. The aim of this approach is to examine if these policies have any eﬀect
on the international supply of capital flows. If I use net capital flows as the existing
literature does (i.e gross inflows net of gross outflows), it will be more diﬃcult to iso-
late and identify the overall eﬀect of unconventional policies adopted by the Federal
Reserve. As Forbes and Warnock (2011) note, analyzing only net capital flows may
give inaccurate results as the decisions of domestic investors incorporated in capital
outflows could be driven by diﬀerent factors even if gross capital inflows and gross
capital outflows have a similar pattern.
The data used comprise quarterly information of foreign direct investment, eq-
uities, debt and other private inflows in EMEs from the IMF balance of payments
data. This data is compiled for 46 EMEs. The results suggest that UMP exerted
an important eﬀect on capital inflows to EMEs. These eﬀects depend on the type of
unconventional measure examined and the eﬀect is strengthened if there is a higher
financial exposure of each country to the US. There is evidence of portfolio recom-
position across countries and the global investor risk, the real GDP growth jointly
with other specific country variables play an important role in driving capital flows.
Finally, there is evidence of cross-sectional dependences in the static panel data spec-
ification. Controlling for this dependences in the error distribution strengthen the
previous results.
Although I focus my analysis on UMP adopted by the Fed, I cannot disregard the
importance of other variables as determinants of capital flows. Bernanke’s speech on
October 14 2012 about the international spillover eﬀects of unconventional policies
explains that not only policies taken in developed countries (i.e. UMP) are respon-
sible for the recent increase in capital flows to EMEs. There are other variables
such as the investor risk appetite and the decisions made by policymakers in EMEs
that are crucial in driving capital flows. Based on Bernanke’s analysis, I include
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the Chicago Board of Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) as a measure of risk
but with a diﬀerential eﬀect for each country, real GDP growth diﬀerentials between
each economy and the US, short term interest rates diﬀerentials and other underlying
domestic factors.
There are three main strands in the literature on capital flows. First, the tradi-
tional push and pull factors approach analyzing global and country specific determi-
nants of capital flows. For instance, Ahmed and Zlate (2013) study the impact of a
set of global and domestic variables and examine the impact of UMP announcements
on net portfolio capital flows in 12 EMEs. They use dummy variables indicating an-
nouncement dates and actual UMP operations. In addition, they isolate the direct
eﬀect of these policies on long term treasury rates and then evaluate their impact on
capital flows. Fratzscher (2011) and Fratzscher et al. (2012) analyze at the micro
level the impact of global and domestic factors and the role of unconventional mea-
sures on net portfolio capital flows in advanced and developing economies during the
recent global crisis and in the recovery. They use dummy variables as measures of
Fed announcements and continuous variables as the weekly change of actual oper-
ations to examine the existence of portfolio recomposition. Byrne and Fiess (2011)
examine if there are common factors driving the volatility of capital flows in emerging
and developing countries. Forbes and Warnock (2011) study the dynamic of capital
flows using gross flows instead of net flows to examine the behaviour of domestic
and foreign investors and to identify periods of extreme capital flows classified as
episodes of surges, stops or flight and retrenchment.
Second, the literature studying the unobserved components of capital flows break-
ing down the data into unobserved permanent and temporary components. This lit-
erature uses state space models estimated by Kalman filtering methods (e.g. Sarno
and Taylor 1999 and Mody et al. 2001). Finally, few studies have analyzed the
determinants of capital flows using a supply and demand disequilibrium approach.
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Mody and Taylor (2002) and Felices and Orskaug (2008) are the only papers to my
knowledge that have estimated demand and supply functions for capital flows, allow-
ing for market disequilibrium. This implies that the supply and demand of capital is
not always in equilibrium, and the role of imperfect information emphasized in these
papers is crucial in determining capital flows.
This paper relates closely to the literature of push and pull factors. However, I
go one step further as I estimate the eﬀect of global factors as heterogeneous across
countries. The main essential diﬀerence is that I incorporate in my estimations a
diﬀerential eﬀect of UMP on gross capital inflows in EMEs that relies on the degree
of financial exposure of each country to the US. In addition, as I study the impact
of UMP from a foreign investor perspective, this analysis builds on the theory of
disequilibrium between the supply and demand of capital because I am studying
the eﬀect of the US supply of capital in EMEs using data on gross private capital
inflows. Modelling a disequilibrium econometric approach with panel data analysis
is challenging and there are no studies approaching the impact of UMP on capital
flows using this framework. This is the next stage of my research.
The next section describes the adoption of UMP in the US and their international
spillovers. Section 3.3 analyses the recent evolution of capital flows in EMEs. Section
3.4 explains the empirical methodology and the data set. Section 3.5 discusses the
empirical results of the benchmark model and robustness tests. Section 3.6 covers
the conclusions and the next stage of my research.
3.2 Fed Unconventional Monetary Policies and In-
ternational Spillovers
Non conventional monetary policy measures are usually called unconventional bal-
ance sheet policy measures as they have expanded the size and changed the com-
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position of the Federal Reserve balance sheets. There are two diﬀerent types of
measures. First, financial stability measures aimed to restore the functioning of the
financial system. Second, macro-stability measures to boost the economic activity
by reducing long term rates. The timeline and description of each of the measures
adopted by the Federal Reserve are summarized in Table B.1.
Financial stability policies take two forms, domestic and foreign exchange liq-
uidity provision measures. The Term Auction Facility Program was introduced in
December 2007 to reduce the pressure in short term funding markets associated
with problems in the subprime mortgage market. In early 2008, the Term Securities
Lending Facility and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility were introduced to alleviate
term funding and collateral pressures faced by primary dealers. In addition, after
the collapse of Lehman Brothers the Fed established additional measures to provide
liquidity in key credit markets. Within these liquidity facilities were introduced the
Commercial Paper Funding Facility, the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, the Money Market Investor Funding Facil-
ity, and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility. Regarding foreign exchange
liquidity measures, bilateral foreign exchange swaps arrangements were introduced in
order to alleviate periods of liquidity stress in US dollar funding in foreign financial
markets.
Macro-stability measures in the US adopted by the Federal Reserve are related
to the Large Scale Asset Purchases Program (LSAP) introduced in late 2008. This
round of quantitative easing was called QE1. As the Fed states, this program in-
volves purchases of long term securities (i.e mortgage-backed securities) issued or
guaranteed by government sponsored agencies such as Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae
and purchases of long term Treasury bonds. The aim of this program is to reduce
mortgage interest rates, improving house markets functioning, and to lower long term
interest rates in order to boost the economy as conventional policies are ineﬀective
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due to short term rates are near to the zero lower bound. Two rounds of quantita-
tive easing, QE2 and QE3 were announced in November 2010 and September 2012
respectively. In addition to the LSAP, the Fed introduced the Maturity Extension
Program between September 2011 and December 2012 in order to increase the av-
erage maturity of its Treasury securities holdings and to lower even more long term
interest rates.
It is important to mention that the liquidity conditions that followed the recent
financial crisis forced some EMEs to adopt unconventional central bank measures.
These measures include domestic liquidity easing, foreign exchange easing and credit
easing instruments. However, the role of unconventional policies in EMEs is diﬀerent
than in advanced economies. Unconventional polices in EMEs have limited impact on
the volume of capital flows as their aim is to alleviate periods of domestic and foreign
exchange liquidity stress in the short run but not to attain macroeconomic objectives
or to restore the functioning of key markets as in advanced economies. According
to Ishi et al. (2009), factors such as external vulnerability, limited financial stress,
and less policy credibility in EMEs restrict the use of unconventional policies such as
quantitative easing. Following Ishi et al. (2009), I find that unconventional policies in
EMEs are not homogeneous within countries and the only way to characterize them
is using indicator variables. This methodology is not appropriate with quarterly data
because only captures discreet shifts in the average level of capital flows and not the
overall eﬀect of these type of policies. Due to the nature of unconventional policies in
EMEs, this paper only focuses in studying non standard monetary policies adopted
in the US and their eﬀect on capital flows in EMEs. Nevertheless, 34 countries from
the sample used in this paper are economies which adopted non conventional policies
during the recent financial crisis.
What are the channels through which UMP adopted by the Fed aﬀect the dy-
namic of capital flows? The recent literature consider four main channels. The
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portfolio channel implies that the Fed can reduce the supply of a specific security
and investors with certain degree of preference for the asset will push up its price
(i.e. reduce its yield). This channel works under the assumption of imperfect sub-
stitutability. For instance, Gagnon et al. (2010) and D’ Amico et al. (2012) find
evidence that the LSAP has reduced long term Treasury yields and investors have
rebalanced their portfolios towards riskier assets increasing their prices. Fratzscher
et al. (2012) show evidence that the LSAP adopted by the Fed lowered long term
bond yields in the US and significantly in EMEs. In addition, long term Treasury
purchases increased equity returns in the US and in EMEs and this is related to the
degree of substitutability between assets.
The signaling channel works when announcements made by the Fed change ex-
pectations regarding the future stance of monetary policy. The impact of the first
and second round of quantitative easing announcements are diﬀerent from the third
round of announcements known as tapering news. While the first two rounds are
related to a highly loose monetary policy, the third round modifies expectations as
market participants anticipate that the Fed will start to increase its short-term policy
rate. For instance, if announcements are credible they could convince markets that
the Fed is committed to reduce or increase future policy interest rates and this will
rebalance investors portfolios. Fratzscher et al. (2012) finds evidence that Treasury
purchases and announcements depreciated the US dollar versus other currencies, es-
pecially against currencies of developed countries. This goes in line with the channel
of transmission of conventional monetary policies when the Fed is committed to a
loose policy stance.
Fratzscher et al. (2012) describes two additional channels. The confidence chan-
nel implies that in addition to the signals that announcements give about the future
stance of monetary policy, they could give information about the economic perfor-
mance. For instance, if markets perceive that Fed announcements indicate a dete-
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rioration in the US economy that would decrease asset prices and trigger investors
to invest in safer securities. Finally, the liquidity channel operates through liquidity
operations and purchases of mortgage-backed securities aimed to restore the func-
tioning of key markets and to reduce the liquidity premia. If financial deleveraging is
not prevented by these measures that will imply fire sales in diﬀerent type of assets,
aﬀecting the dynamic of capital flows. The eﬀects of liquidity operations and pur-
chases of mortgage-backed securities on the US dollar are diﬀerent than purchases
of long term bonds. For instance, Fratzscher et al. (2012) find that these operations
aimed to restore the functioning and intermediation in key markets appreciated the
US dollar as result of an increased of capital inflows in the US.
Although the literature on the international spillovers of UMP has evaluated ex-
tensively their impact on asset prices, the focus of this paper is on the relevance of
Fed UMP for international private capital flows. The eﬀects of Fed UMP on capital
flows in EMEs may depend on the type of measure adopted, the degree of substi-
tutability between assets and the financial exposure of each country to the US. It
is important to follow the heterogeneity of eﬀects of diﬀerent forms of UMP across
asset type (e.g. foreign direct investment, equity, debt and other flows) under an
econometric framework where the degree of financial exposure to the US explains
the diﬀerential eﬀects of Fed policies in each country. For instance, it is expected
that liquidity measures and purchases of agencies bonds sponsored by the govern-
ment attract capital flows to the US and reduce capital flows to EMEs because they
are aimed to improve the functioning of key markets in the US. However, announce-
ments and purchases of long term Treasuries are expected to decrease their yield and
increased the demand of other class of assets such as equities or other banking in-
vestments, increasing capital flows in EMEs. If bonds and equities and other type of
assets are imperfect substitutes as I explained before, this generate a rebalancing of
portfolios between assets and countries. Finally, all these eﬀects on capital flows are
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expected to be diminished in countries who have lower degree of financial exposure
to the US.
Figure 3.1 describes the diﬀerent channels through which UMP aﬀect portfolio
capital flows to EMEs. A positive sign implies an increase in capital inflows in
EMEs and a negative sign a decline. I analyze separately the LSAP and Liquidity
Measures adopted by the Fed. Regarding the LSAP operations, I expect an increase
in portfolio inflows to EMEs through the portfolio and signaling channel. However,
the eﬀect on each type of portfolio flow (i.e. equity or bonds) depends on the degree
of substitutability between assets. The eﬀect of LSAP through the confidence and
liquidity channel is ambiguous. For instance, an increase in confidence might boost
consumption and the willingness of private investors to invest either in US assets
or in assets in EMEs. In addition, as MBS operations aim is to improve the house
market functioning, this would imply a portfolio rebalancing from equities into bonds
in the US and probably an increase in portfolio capital inflows in EMEs. Regarding
the Liquidity Measures, I expect a decline in capital inflows in EMEs as they are
aimed to improve the functioning of the US financial system. Although I do not
include other flows (i.e. banking flows) in Figure 3.1, the expected signs of this
type of flow are positive as a decrease in the liquidity premium induced by UMP
will reduce private sector borrowing costs increasing bank lending in the US and
in EMEs. Regarding foreign direct investment (FDI), the eﬀect of UMP may be
diminished by its higher persistence compared to other type of assets. However,
according to the IMF (2011b), the permanence of FDI has decreased since the early
2000s and this could aﬀect positively the eﬀect of UMP on the pattern of this type
of flow. Nevertheless, I expect that the eﬀect of UMP on FDI flows is marginal in
comparison to the other type of assets.
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Figure 3.1: Transmission Channels of Fed Unconventional Monetary Policies on Port-
folio Capital Inflows in EMEs
I want to emphasize that all these channels may work simultaneously as Fratzcher
et al. (2012) explains, and the objective of this paper is to evaluate the overall impact
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of UMP on international capital inflows that is the result of the interaction of these
channels. The expected signs of the eﬀects of these measures described in Figure 3.1
are just an indication of how UMP eﬀects on capital flows are transmitted through
diﬀerent mechanisms.
3.3 The Dynamic of Capital Flows in EMEs
The selection of an appropriate measure of capital flows is fundamental in this paper.
First, I examine the dynamics of US bilateral capital outflows vis-a-vis the rest of
the world, focusing on EMEs. I divide the analysis in three periods. The baseline
or pre-crisis period from January 2000 to December 2007, the crisis period from
January 2008 to June 2009, and the Quantitative Easing (QE) period, divided in
QE1 from April 2009 to September 2009, QE2 from October 2010 to June 2011, and
QE3 from October 2012 to June 2013. QE1, QE2 and QE3 correspond to the first,
second and third phase of the LSAP program respectively. I do not include a separate
period for the Liquidity Measures adopted by the Fed as they where announced and
implemented during the beginning of the crisis period. This analysis is based on the
approach used by Morgan (2011) that evaluates the impact of the first two rounds of
quantitative easing on US bilateral capital flows to Asia. The main diﬀerence is that
I include the pre-crisis and the crisis period, the third round of quantitative easing
known as QE3 and other regions such as Latin America, the Middle East and Africa.
Table B.2 describes US Gross Capital Outflows to the rest of the world using data
from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. During the pre-crisis period there were
total outflows of US$183 billion. This dynamic was reverted during the crisis with
reverse outflows of US$98 billion. During QE1 there were total outflows of US$238
billion that represents an excess of capital outflows from the US to the rest of the
world of US$55 billion comparing with the baseline period. In addition, the pattern
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of capital outflows from the US to the rest of the world is similar for the second and
third phase of the LSAP program. For instance, during QE2 and QE3 there were
total outflows of US$176 billion and US$149 billion, respectively.
How much of this outflows went to emerging Asia, Latin America, the Middle
East, Africa and Europe? Tables B.3 to B.7 show that during the pre-crisis period
there were outflows of US$10 billion to emerging Asia, US$36 billion to Latin America
and Other Western Hemisphere, only US$2 billion to the Middle East and Africa, and
US$111 billion to Europe. This means that about 61% of the total outflows from the
US to the rest of the world went to Europe. There are no significant diﬀerences during
the adoption of QE. In the first round, US$14 billion went to emerging Asia, US$6
billion to the Middle East and Africa, US$160 billion to Europe, and US$24 billion
were repatriated from Latin America. A similar pattern is observed for the second
and third round of QE, with the exception of Latin America which experienced
capital inflows from the US during QE3.
Morgan (2011) compares the first two rounds of quantitative easing to the post
crisis period between October 2009 and September 2010. He finds that large excess
of capital flows ended up in Europe. Although in my analysis I only find evidence
of excess of capital outflows from the US in the first phase of quantitative easing,
the inspection of data on US bilateral flows suggests that the eﬀect of QE on capital
flows in EMEs is marginal. In addition, as Morgan (2011) explains, analyzing US
bilateral capital outflows vis-a-vis the rest of the world could produce misleading
results because Europe and in particular the UK acts as a channel for capital flows
to the rest of the world. This is the main reason that I choose cross border gross
capital flows data in my empirical analysis as they include all the transactions of
each country with the rest of the world.
Figure 3.2 describes the dynamics of cross border gross capital inflows in EMEs
by type of flow using information from the IMF. Between January 2000 and June
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2007, gross capital inflows in EMEs experienced a positive trend due to diﬀerent
factors that changed positively foreign investors sentiment in these economies. The
continuos decrease of short term interest rates in advanced economies to face the
slow down of their economies and the higher prospects of economic growth in EMEs
are within other factors crucial in explaining the dynamics of capital inflows during
that period. During the crisis period, it was notable the reversal of capital flows to
EMEs. This fact as Arias et al. (2012) explain coincides with lower interest rates in
advanced economics as countercyclical measures taken by the monetary authorities.
It is evident from the data the lagged eﬀects of the crisis on FDI flows. This
may be the result of a higher permanent component that the existing literature
finds. However, although FDI is the less volatile type of flow, according to the IMF
(2011b) it has been less stable during the last decade. During the QE period gross
capital inflows in EMEs peaked due to diﬀerent factors such as the persistent lower
interest rates in advanced economies and lower risk aversion of foreign investors to
invest in EMEs. However, that surge of capital inflows to EMEs was stronger during
the first two phases of the LSAP program. As Nechio (2014) notes, the adoption
of unconventional policies in advanced economies is not the only factor aﬀecting
investor decisions, domestic economic conditions in EMEs play an important role in
determining the pattern of capital flows. This is the explanation of why capital flows
to EMEs started to slow down at the beginning of 2013 when the Fed announced to
scale back large-scale purchases of government and asset-backed securities.
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Figure 3.2: Gross Capital Inflows in EMEs
Figure 3.3 describes the dynamics of capital inflows in EMEs by region. Between
2000 and 2007 capital inflows experienced an incremental growth in emerging Asia,
Latin America and Europe. However, during the crisis emerging Europe and emerg-
ing Asia were the most aﬀected as a result of the deterioration of some macroeconomic
indicators. During the QE period gross capital flows in EMEs were recovering to the
previous levels of the crisis, especially in emerging Asia. However, since late 2009
the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone has adversely aﬀected capital flows to this
region. Nevertheless, only until I analyze the behaviour of capital flows using the
econometric methodology explained in the next section, I could infer what are the
real eﬀects of UMP on capital flows in EMEs.
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Figure 3.3: Gross Capital Inflows in EMEs by Region
3.4 Empirical Methodology and the Data Set
This study uses quarterly data on cross border gross capital inflows from the Balance
of Payments (BOP) statistics of the IMF. As I explained in section 3.3, I do not use
data on US bilateral flows vis-a-vis Emerging Economies as it may bias the results
because an important percent of the supply of capital flows from the US to the rest
to the world is channeled through Europe, especially through the UK.
The period analyzed covers January 2000 to June 2013, and the sample includes
46 EMEs. The list of countries included in the analysis are listed in Table B.8. I
exclude oﬀshore financial centers in the baseline estimations, and they are included
only for robustness tests. I use gross private capital inflows of Foreign Direct In-
vestment (FDI), equities, debt and other private flows (i.e. banking flows) excluding
other investment flows to the monetary authorities and the general government. In
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addition, I construct a series of overall gross capital inflows to EMEs adding all
these type of flows. Although the analysis can be done in terms of gross nominal
capital flows or gross real capital flows, I use nominal capital inflows data. Under
a scenario of high and volatile inflation rates, it is better to do the analysis in real
terms. However, if an economy is experiencing high inflation rates it is diﬃcult to
infer the eﬀect of unconventional policies on capital flows as a possible increase in
the supply of capital from the US to EMEs could be undermined by a high inflation
rate. Thus, the main objective of this paper which evaluates the impact of UMP
on the dynamics of capital flows would depend on the behaviour of domestic prices.
It is important to note that 16 out of 46 countries of the data sample analysed in
this paper adopted inflation targeting as monetary framework which attempts to
maintain a low and stable inflation level. The relative merit of using nominal capital
flows is that foreign exchange policies taken by policy makers such as capital controls
are usually based upon nominal flows into and out of the country’s capital account.
The literature usually uses indicator variables to evaluate the impact of UMP
announcements on capital flows with the exception of Fratzscher et al. (2012) that
also use actual interventions. In this paper I only use actual interventions for two
reasons. First, as I am using quarterly data it is not possible to capture the over-
all eﬀect of announcements on capital flows using indicator variables because they
will imply a discreet shift in the average level of capital flows in an specific quar-
ter but are not capturing the immediate eﬀect of any announcement at any specific
day. Second, as I want to test that UMP have a diﬀerential eﬀect in each coun-
try and depends on their financial exposure to the US, actual purchases are more
appropriate in my model. The reason is that actual interventions have a direct ef-
fect on the amount of capital available in the US economy and this aﬀects directly
the supply of capital from the US to the rest of the world. Nevertheless, I am not
saying that forward looking agents do not react to announcements. Using actual
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interventions is suitable in this case to get an appropriate regressor that captures
the diﬀerential eﬀect of UMP on each country. I divide unconventional Fed policies
into two categories: liquidity market operations (LM) and the Large Scale Asset
Purchase Program (LSAP) which includes purchases of mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) and long term treasury bonds (TR).
Although I focus my analysis on UMP adopted by the Fed, I include another
variables as important factors driving capital flows. As Bernanke states in his speech
on October 14 2012, diﬀerent factors could aﬀect the behaviour of capital flows in
EMEs. First, the policy measures adopted in developed countries (i.e. UMP). Second
the investors risk appetite and finally the decisions made by policymakers in EMEs.
Hence, I specify what variables need to be included as explanatory variables in my
baseline model in line with Bernanke’s considerations.
My baseline regression specification is a standard dynamic panel data model
with country fixed eﬀects, including the first lag of the dependent variable in order
to account for the degree of persistence of capital flows as follows:
CFi,t =  CFi,t 1 +  1(ki ⇥ LMt) +  2(ki ⇥ LSAP t) +  3( i ⇥ V IXt 1) (3.4.1)
+  0Xi,t 1 + 'Crisist + ↵i + ui,t
where i refers to country i; CFi,t are gross private capital inflows in EMEs in
US dollars for each type of asset and aggregated; LMt and LSAP t are the quarterly
change in the amount outstanding of liquidity market operations and the Large Scale
Asset Purchase Program respectively, with LSAP divided in purchases of long term
government bonds (TR) and mortgage-backed securities (MBS); ki is a measure of
the direct financial exposure of each country to the US; V IXt 1 is the Chicago Board
of Options Exchange Volatility Index as a measure of global risk but weighted by
121
a measure of international financial exposure of each country  i; Xi,t 1 is a vector
of controls such as the real GDP growth diﬀerential between each economy and the
US, the interest rate diﬀerential between short term rates in each country and the
eﬀective federal funds rate, the ratio of imports plus exports over GDP as a measure
of openness, the real eﬀective exchange rate (REER), and sovereign credit ratings;
Crisist is a crisis indicator variable equal to one between 2008Q3 and 2009Q2 and
zero otherwise as this is the period that coincides with the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers in September 2008 and when capital flows dropped dramatically as a result of this
and other events related to the recent financial crisis; ↵i are country fixed eﬀects; ui,t
is the residual with mean equal to zero.  1ki and  2ki are the immediate eﬀects of
Liquidity Measures and LSAP respectively on gross capital inflows in country i with
financial exposure to the US ki relative to a country with no financial exposure to
the US. A detailed description of the dataset sources can be found in the Appendix
Table B.9.2
As the literature has recognised that the Least Squared Dummy Variable (LSDV)
estimator for equation(3.4.1) is not consistent for finite T (Nickell 1981), I use the
Bias-corrected LSDV estimator with bootstrapped standard errors to avoid sample
size bias following Bruno (2005a). Although the Arellano and Bond estimator is one
of the most used techniques for dynamic panel data, the results can be biased as its
properties hold when the sample size is large. The recent literature in econometrics
finds that the Bias-corrected LSDV estimator outperforms the Arellano and Bond es-
timator in terms of bias and root mean squared error criteria for small cross-sections
2I use a similar approach to the IMF (2011b). They analyze the impact of conventional monetary
policies in the US on capital flows in EMEs and advanced economies, where changes in the US
monetary policy are weighted by a measure of direct financial exposure to the US. There are three
main diﬀerences of my approach. First, I focus my analysis on unconventional monetary policies
and their eﬀect on capital flows in EMEs. Second, I only use gross capital inflows instead of net
flows for the reasons explained in the introduction of this paper. Third, I construct in a diﬀerent
way the direct and international financial exposure measures used to weight the UMP and the VIX
regressors, respectively. For instance, the IMF (2011b) uses assets and liabilities of country i to the
US to construct those measures. I only use liabilities as my study focuses on capital investment of
non-residents abroad.
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(N) and finite (T) time periods. In addition, the Bias-corrected LSDV estimator is
suitable for unbalanced panel-data models. The bias correction was initialized by
Anderson and Hsiao estimator as it has the highest root mean squared error and the
best bias performance for all the coeﬃcients according to Bruno (2005b). The stan-
dard errors were bootstrapped in Stata calculating a bootstrap variance-covariance
matrix using 100 repetitions. Stata allows three possible bias approximations and I
chose the one with higher degree of accuracy up to order O(N 1T 2). Furthermore,
the errors are assumed to be normal, and I use a parametric bootstrap technique as
there is dependency in the data generation process. This procedure follows Kiviet
and Bun (2001) as they find it simpler, relatively more accurate, and it is suitable
for any type of Bias-corrected LSDV estimator.
The coeﬃcients  ,   and ' from the Bias-corrected LSDV model of the equation
(3.4.1) can be thought as short-run coeﬃcients measuring the immediate eﬀect of
temporary shocks in UMP, the set of control variables Xi,t 1, and the financial crisis
on the dynamic of capital flows. Long-run parameters can be identified as  1   ,
 
1  
and '1   following Pesaran and Zhao (1999) and Pesaran and Shin (1999). According
to Pesaran and Zhao (1999), when the sample size is small it is necessary to correct
the bias introduced by the non-linear transformation of the short-run parameters in
order to get long-run unbiased coeﬃcients. As the sample size is relatively long (54
quarters), I do not use the bootstrap bias-corrected estimator proposed by Pesaran
and Zhao (1999). Instead, I follow Pesaran and Shin (1999) that use the autoregres-
sive distributed lag model (ARDL) to analyse long-run relations when the underlying
regressors are I(1) or I(0) using standard normal asymptotic theory. Pesaran and
Shin (1999) find that irrespective of whether the explanatory variables follow a sta-
tionary process or not, the ARDL model yields consistent long-run parameters.
According to the analysis of the diﬀerent channels through which UMP may aﬀect
capital flows, the prior for the signs of  1 and  2 are negative (-) and positive (+)
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respectively. Liquidity Measures are aimed to restore the functioning of the financial
system and will reduce capital inflows to EMEs as investors will gain confidence in the
US economy, while LSAP are aimed to reduce mortgage and long term interest rates,
increasing the liquidity available in the economy and making investors more willing
to direct their capital to diﬀerent assets in EMEs. However, MBS interventions might
reduce capital inflows to EMES as they are also aimed to restore the functioning of
the house market in the US.
The weight used for each of the UMP categories as a measure of the direct









where i refers to country i; c are the diﬀerent types of capital such as foreign
direct investment, bank loans, bonds and other investment class; LcUS,i represents
the liabilities of country i to the US; and Li is the international liability position of
country i. As I analyze the dynamics of capital flows from the foreign investor per-
spective, I only include liabilities of each country i to the US because asset liabilities
of domestic residents from the Balance of Payments definition are related to gross
capital flows from the rest of the world to EMEs. The source of bilateral equity,
bonds, banking and non banking claims of the US vis-à-vis EMEs is the U.S. Trea-
sury International Capital (TIC) System database; US FDI abroad is collected from
the U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis Foreign Direct Investment Statistics; and the
international liability position for each economy is obtained from the IMF’s Balance
of Payments Statistics International Investment Position Section.
The ideal measure of the direct financial exposure would be a quarterly time-
varying indicator. However, there is no information available between 2000 and 2003
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in the database of the TIC System. In addition, the data on US FDI abroad is
only available on an annual basis and quarterly data on the international liability
position is available without gaps in 10 countries of the sample analyzed. In view
of these considerations, I construct the financial exposure weight to the US as the
annual average over 2003 and 2007 for the numerator and denominator as this is the
period with higher coverage that precedes the recent financial crisis. In addition, I
construct this weight taking the annual average over the years 2003-2007 and 2011-
2012 to analyze if there are substantial changes in the financial exposure of each
economy to the US after the peak of the crisis that may change the overall eﬀect of
UMP on capital flows. Figures A.1 to A.4 describe the annual time-varying direct
financial exposure by region between 2003 and 2012. There is evidence that the
financial exposure to the US has been fairly stable during that period with notable
changes between 2008 and 2010, especially in countries of emerging Asia. This is the
main reason to exclude 2008-2010 in the construction of the direct financial exposure
weight.
Similarly, I weight the VIX variable with the international financial exposure of
each country in order to isolate the eﬀect of this global factor on each economy. This







where Li are the average external liabilities of each country i between 2003 and
2007, and GDPi is the annual nominal gross domestic product of country i aver-
aged for the same period. Following the approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998), the
advantage of weighting UMP is to identify a causal eﬀect of these policies on the
dynamics of capital flows by focusing on a specific mechanism. Using this mecha-
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nism that relies on the degree of financial exposure of each country to the US makes
more credible the empirical approach as assuming that the impact of UMP is ho-
mogeneous across countries may result in an omitted variable problem, especially
if the eﬀect coincides with major global events such as the recent financial crisis.
From an econometric point of view, I address the omitted variable problem present
in the existent literature using an interaction between a variable that varies across
countries (i.e direct financial exposure to the US) with a variable that varies over
time (i.e. UMP) but controlling for the recent financial crisis as the most important
global event in the period analyzed. Table B.10 lists all the EMEs included in this
methodology with their corresponding financial exposures to the US and the interna-
tional financial exposure. Panama, Israel, Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Korea have the
highest degree of financial exposure to the US from a foreign investor perspective.
One important caveat is that the adoption of unconventional policies by the
Fed may have been endogenous to financial shocks and market developments. As
Fratzscher et al. (2012) explain, it is diﬃcult to deal with the endogeneity bias,
especially using instrumental variables due to the lack of good instruments to model
endogeneity. They deal with it including variables that control for global market
developments such as the VIX and including lags of Fed interventions. Fratzscher
et al. (2012) state that UMP adopted by the Fed were in the majority of cases
countercyclical and if the endogeneity bias is eliminated from the estimations this
will make stronger the estimated coeﬃcients. In addition to these considerations, I
include a crisis dummy variable in order to distinguish the eﬀects of common global
events on capital flows from the eﬀects of the adoption of unconventional policies as
they could have occurred at the same time. Finally, with the exception of UMP I





In the baseline model I do not include oﬀshore financial centers as the nature of
capital flows may be diﬀerent in these economies. I use the Im-Pesaran-Shin test
and the Maddala and Wu Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP tests as first generation unit
root tests for strongly balanced data. The null hypothesis evaluated with these tests
is that all the panels have a unit root. For instance, the Im-Pesaran-Shin test assumes
that the autoregressive parameter is panel specific and the errors are independently
distributed normal, while the Maddala and Wu Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP test
conduct a unit root test for each panel separately and then combine the p-values
to get an overall test. I consider two cases for the Im-Pesaran-Shin Test. The first
one assumes serially uncorrelated errors and reports the usual t statistic under the
assumption that both the number of panels (N) and the time (T) are fixed. The
second case allows for serially correlated errors and reports an statistic that follows
an asymptotically standard normal distribution as N and T tends to infinity. The
number of lags in the second case are chosen by minimizing the AIC criterion.
The Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP tests perform either ADF or Phillips-Perron unit
root tests. Although these tests report in Stata the inverse  2, the inverse logit
transformation, the inverse normal, and a modified inverse  2, I report the inverse
normal statistic as is suitable for the data sample used with finite N. Cross-sectional
means are removed in the Im-Pesaran-Shin test and the Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP
tests to mitigate the impact of cross-sectional dependence. In addition, I use the
Pesaran’s CIPS test as a second generation unit root test in heterogeneous panels
with cross-sectional dependence. The null hypothesis tested is that all series are
non-stationary, and the test reported is distributed standard normal as the panels
are unbalanced.
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Table B.11 reports the results of unit root tests. The IPS test with serial cor-
relation in the residuals reject the null hypothesis of unit root only at the 10%
significance level for the ratio of imports plus exports over GDP and the Pesaran
test does not reject it. However, I include this variable in levels as the other unit root
tests reject the same hypothesis at the 5% significance level. In addition, I include
REER in first diﬀerences in the main regressions as there is evidence of unit root in
all tests with the exception of the IPS test with serial correlated residuals and the
Fisher-ADF test. The Institutional Investor’s Country Credit index is a measure of
country risk provided by leading global banks and money management firms. This
measure is constructed based on the answers regarding diﬀerent types of risk such as
political risk, exchange rate risk, sovereign risk, and economic risk. Each country is
graded on a scale from 0 to 100, with 100 implying the least probability of default.
As this variable is an index which represents diﬀerent probabilities of default, it is
not appropriate to think that it follows a non stationary process as the rating for
each country represents if the credit score is bad or good. In this paper, I use the
first diﬀerence of the index to see the direct impact of various likelihoods of default
on capital flows and I do not test the null hypothesis of unit root.3
The benchmark specification estimates for gross total capital inflows are reported
in Table 3.1. The model reports a higher degree of persistence of total gross capital
inflows. I will focus at first instance on the estimates of UMP, the variable of interest
in this paper. The results reported in Table 3.1 indicate that UMP exerted an
important eﬀect on total private inflows and this depends on the degree of financial
exposure of each country to the US. The magnitude of these eﬀects depends on
the type of unconventional measure examined and the impact on capital flows is
strengthen if countries have higher financial exposure to the US. The coeﬃcients
3One alternative way I might have used this index is creating dummy variables for diﬀerent
ranges of credit scores. For instance, a dummy variable for bad credit scores equal to one if the
score is between 0 and 50, and another dummy variable for good scores equal to one with scores
between 50 and 100.
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on LM, TR and MBS are significant at 1 percent level and statistically diﬀerent
according to the Chi-squared tests reported. There are not significant diﬀerences in
Table 3.1: Gross Private Capital Inflows - Bias-Corrected LSDV, 2000Q1-2013Q2
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the estimations using the average financial exposure weight to the US over 2003-
2007 and over the same period but including 2011-2012. It can be observed in Table
B.10 that the average financial exposure weight to the US changed marginally in
these two periods. Furthermore, these results may be related to the fact that post-
crisis gross capital inflows returned to the levels experienced before the beginning of
the recent financial crisis.
There is evidence that Liquidity Measures (LM) reduced total gross capital in-
flows in EMEs as their main objective is to improve the functioning of the US financial
system. This may have increased the willingness of investors to rebalance their port-
folios within the US. In addition, according to the baseline results, Mortgage-Backed
Securities purchases (MBS) and Long Term Treasury (TR) purchases increased gross
capital inflows in EMEs. MBS purchases restored the functioning and confidence in
key markets such as the house market, and as Fratzscher et al. (2012) explain this
induced inflows not only into US bond markets, it increased capital inflows in other
markets, especially in bond market segments. This may be the reason to get a posi-
tive coeﬃcient in the estimations. Long term government bonds purchases are aimed
to boost the economy decreasing long term interest rates that jointly with an increase
in market liquidity encourage investors to reallocate their capital in EMEs. These
results are in line with the prior expectations described in Section 3.2. In addition,
they give conclusive evidence in terms of the overall eﬀect of UMP on capital inflows
in EMEs in contrast to the previous literature that have found mixed results due to
the fact that it has not recognized the diﬀerential eﬀect of unconventional policies
on capital inflows which depends on factors such as the financial exposure of each
economy to the US.
The results by type of flow are reported in Table 3.2. UMP are found to be
significant for all type of assets with the exception of FDI inflows. The results for













































flows in comparison to the other type of flows. This goes in line with the economy
rationale as I expect a higher degree of persistence in FDI flows due their long-term
nature. One important fact is that the parameters on LM and MBS become insignif-
icant for FDI inflows. This may indicate that the degree of persistence of this type of
flow plays an important role in determining its dynamics jointly with other variables
such as market size that are not included in this model. All the coeﬃcient signs are
in line with the prior expectations except for the eﬀect of LM on FDI inflows. Al-
though the reason that LM increased FDI inflows in EMEs is not completely obvious,
it could be related to the fact that foreign investors allocate this type of investment
according to long-term considerations and they prefer to continue allocating capital
in economies where they already have presence and with higher prospects of eco-
nomic growth. There is a positive eﬀect of TR purchases on FDI inflows possibly
as result of the lower FDI stability over the last decade jointly with the reasons
previously explained for LM. The eﬀect of MBS purchases is marginal in comparison
with other type of assets. There are two possible explanations. First, although FDI
has recently experienced a lower degree of stability, it still has a higher degree of
persistence in comparison with other flows that makes more diﬃcult to capture the
direct eﬀect of UMP. Second, as Sarno and Taylor (1999) explain, the nature of FDI
flows is diﬀerent from portfolio and other type of flows and they are usually driven
by long-term factors such as market size and availability of infrastructure.
Equities are positively aﬀected by MBS interventions, while long term Treasury
purchases have not any impact on them. Long-term government bonds purchases
have increased debt capital inflows in EMEs and may imply a portfolio recomposition
out of equities into bonds and other flows as Fratzscher et al. (2012) explains.
However, I do not study in this paper the mechanism or the degree of portfolio
recomposition within investors. Finally, other inflows such as banking flows are
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notably aﬀected by the adoption of Fed UMP, especially TR purchases and LM. For
instance, TR purchases have increased other capital inflows and this goes in line with
the reduction of lending costs that may encourage the supply of capital to EMEs.
Long-run coeﬃcients of the bias-corrected LSDV model are reported in Tables 3.3
and 3.4. I only report the coeﬃcients related to UMP to see if these policies might
have diﬀerential eﬀects on inflows in the short and long-run. There is evidence that
the long-run impact of UMP on capital inflows in EMEs is higher than the short-run
eﬀect, especially for debt and other capital flows. This result is due to the higher
persistence in the dependent variable captured by its lag in each estimation. All the
signs go in line with the short-run estimations and the coeﬃcients on LM, TR and
MBS are significant at the 1 percent significance level for total gross capital inflows
and debt flows, while LM and MBS are significant at the same level for equity flows,
and LM and TR for other flows.























































Recent literature in capital flows (Nechio 2014) have noted that not only policies
adopted in advanced economies have influenced the pattern of capital flows. Do-
mestic factors have played an important role in determining the recent slow down of
capital inflows to EMEs, especially after the Fed announcement of tapering Quanti-
tative Easing in 2013. Although the main objective of this paper is to analyze the
impact of UMP on capital inflows in EMEs, it is appropriate to explain the impor-
tance of domestic factors and other global factors in driving international capital
flows. The coeﬃcients of the controls used in the estimations have the expected sign
with the exception of interest rate diﬀerentials. For instance, the results reported in
Table 3.1 show that an increase in the global risk measured by the VIX index has
slowed down capital inflows. This is consistent with the economic rationale that a
higher degree of risk implies a higher risk aversion to invest.
Domestic variables such as the ratio of exports and imports over GDP are signif-
icant in the estimations. Their signs go in line to the economic rationale as a higher
degree of openness has a positive eﬀect on capital inflows. Although the coeﬃcients
on the real GDP growth diﬀerential are only significant at the 10 percent level for
total capital inflows estimations and the coeﬃcients on REER are not significant,
they have the expected signs indicating that total capital inflows respond positively
to economic growth and they may be aﬀected by the real exchange rate appreciation
according to the portfolio theory. In addition, credit ratings have the same pattern.
The insensitivity of total gross capital flows to short-term interest rate diﬀerential
may indicate the inclusion of an alternative measure that capture more accurately
arbitrage opportunities across countries. This variable may be the EMBI spread over
the US risk free rate as a measure of the cost of capital or expected return.
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3.5.2 Robustness Tests
I test the robustness of my baseline specification in diﬀerent ways. First, I include
oﬀshore financial centers to determine if the nature of capital flows in these economies
aﬀect the baseline estimations. Second, I augment the benchmark specification in-
cluding additional control variables. I include reserves over short term external debt
as an indicator of the ability to meet short run obligations; and the inflation dif-
ferential between each emerging country and the US as excess inflation over the US
may erode the value of any investment of the US abroad. I include lags of UMP but
I do not report them as they are not significant. Third, I estimate a static panel
data model with country fixed eﬀects and I perform tests of heteroskedasticity and
cross-sectional dependence. I test the null hypothesis of groupwise homoskedastic-
ity in the residuals using a modified Wald test that is distributed  2. This test is
suitable when the assumption of normality in the residuals is violated. In order to
test cross-sectional dependence, I use the Pesaran (2004) test for unbalanced data,
the Friedman test (1937) based on Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcient, and the
Frees test (1995, 2004) based on the sum of squared rank correlation. The Pesaran
test is normally distributed when N is large, while the Friedman test and the Frees
test are asymptotically  2 and Q distributed, respectively. Finally, I estimate the
static panel data model between 2003 and 2012 using a time-varying direct financial
exposure measure. As I explained in section 3.4, the direct financial exposure to the
US has been relatively stable during that period and I want to test econometrically
if the results are robust when a time-varying weight is used taking into consideration
that the data sample is reduced.4
The robustness estimations are reported in Tables B.12-B.21. The results indicate
that the benchmark estimations for total capital inflows are robust to the inclusion
4Although there are no gaps in the data to construct the direct financial exposure measure
between 2003 and 2012, the information is only available at annual basis and I assume that this
measure is equal for each quarter in each year.
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of oﬀshore financial centers and additional control variables. However, the short-run
and long-run estimates are smaller in magnitude after including oﬀshore financial
centers which confirm the diﬀerent nature of these economies (Tables B.12-B.15).
The estimations of the static panel data model without oﬀshore financial centers
are reported in Tables B.16 and B.17. As there is evidence of heteroskedasticity
in the errors according to the Wald test, I use clustered errors according to Stock
and Watson (2008) to allow for serial error correlation in each cross section and for
heteroskedasticity across countries. In addition, as the hypothesis of cross-sectional
independence is rejected according to the Pesaran test reported, I use Driscoll-Kraay
standard errors in Tables B.18 and B.19 to control for cross-sectional dependence as
they are consistent standard errors under heteroskedasticity and robust to diﬀerent
forms of cross-sectional dependence. I only report the results of the Pesaran test as
the Friedman and Frees tests reach the same conclusion. According to the results
reported in Table B.18, using standards errors that account for cross-sectional de-
pendences eliminate the significance of MBS purchases in determining the pattern of
capital flows. Although this is not the main objective of this paper, cross-sectional
dependences may be crucial in the role played by UMP in driving capital flows and
modelling them is fundamental in the analysis of their international spillovers. Over-
all, the estimations of the static panel data model are robust to the main results and
all the coeﬃcients of UMP continue to be significant as in the baseline results con-
firming the previous findings. Finally, the static panel data model is robust to the
inclusion of a time-varying financial exposure (Table B.20), with the exception of
the coeﬃcient on MBS purchases that is only significant at the 10 percent level.
The baseline estimations for capital flows by type are robust to the inclusion of
oﬀshore financial centers, additional controls and the correction of cross-sectional de-
pendences in the error (Table B.19). However, as in the case of total flows controlling
for this dependences make insignificant the eﬀect of MBS purchases, particularly in
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debt flows. The control variable reserves over external debt is significant for debt
and other flows highlighting the importance to meet short run obligations as a fun-
damental factor in the supply of capital. Finally, all the main results regarding the
eﬀect of UMP on equity, debt and other flows are still robust to these new specifica-
tions even in the estimations that include a time-varying financial exposure measure
reported in Table B.21.
3.6 Conclusions and Future Research
This paper analyses the impact of Unconventional Monetary Policies on gross capital
inflows in EMEs from a diﬀerent perspective. The recent literature models UMP as
a set of global factors without recognizing that non-conventional monetary policies
have a diﬀerentiated eﬀect on each economy. In addition, the literature has focused
on studying the channels through which these policies aﬀect capital flows. I use an
approach that follows Rajan and Zingales (1998) reasoning, as I estimate a causal
eﬀect of UMP on the dynamics of capital flows in EMEs by focusing on a specific
mechanism. This mechanism relies on the direct financial exposure of each economy
to the US which augments or diminishes the impact of UMP on gross capital inflows
transmitted by diﬀerent channels (i.e portfolio, signaling, coordination and liquidity
channel). This study is of interest to economic policymakers because I find evidence
of a specific mechanism by which these policies aﬀect the dynamics of capital flows
and it may be the smoking gun in the mixed evidence found in the literature. In
addition, Central Banks may adopt strong macroeconomic policies to face the overall
eﬀects of Fed policies if they take into consideration the degree of exposure to the US
without ignoring the importance of other underlying fundamentals such as domestic
factors.
Using a bias-corrected LSDV panel data model with fixed eﬀects for 46 EMEs and
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controlling for the recent financial crisis, I find that UMP play an important role in
driving capital flows. The magnitude of these eﬀects depends on the type of measure
examined, the type of flow and the size of the direct financial exposure to the US. All
the coeﬃcients related to UMP are significant for total gross capital flows. There is
evidence that liquidity measures have slowed down the volume of capital inflows in
EMEs, while purchases of treasury government bonds and mortgage-backed securities
have increased capital inflows. These results go in line with the prior expectations
derived from the diﬀerent channels of transmission. By type of flow the results are
in line with the previous findings. Debt flows and other flows are the main drivers of
total capital flows in these economies. The eﬀect of UMP on FDI flows is marginal in
comparison to other type of flows due to their higher degree of persistence found in
the dynamic panel data regressions and may be due to other important factors such
as market size that are not modeled in this paper. As UMP might have diﬀerential
eﬀects on inflows in the short and long-run, I estimate the long-run coeﬃcients and
find evidence that the long-run impact of UMP on capital inflows in EMEs is higher
than the short-run eﬀect, especially for debt and other capital flows.
It is evident from the estimations that non-conventional measures are not the only
fundamental factors driving capital flows. Other factors such as the VIX, the real
GDP growth diﬀerences, the ratio of imports plus exports over GDP, and the REER
are important drivers of capital flows. Although I do not measure the contribution
of each factor on capital inflows, this is important for policymakers as both, policies
taken in advanced economies and the weakness of domestic economic fundamentals
may change the pattern of the supply of capital in EMEs.
Tests for the implicit homogeneity assumption made across groups could be used
in future research. For instance, Pesaran and Smith (1995) test as null hypothe-
sis that the coeﬃcients of the regressors diﬀer randomly across cross-section units
but are constant over time. In addition, I could include cross-sectional means into
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the dynamic panel data model used in this paper to remove omitted cross-sectional
dependence following Pesaran (2006) that proposes a procedure to estimate panel
data models under the presence of error cross-section dependence. He basically filters
specific regressors using means of cross-section averages in order to remove the poten-
tial diﬀerentiated eﬀects of unobserved features as the number of cross-section units
tends to infinity. The financial exposure measure used in this paper is diﬀerentiated
across cross-section units and capture a source of cross-country heterogeneity. How-
ever, it is possible that there are other sources of heterogeneity that are not uniquely
captured by this variable. Another important extension is to compare the estimated
results of this paper that use a diﬀerentiated degree of financial exposure of each
country to the US, with a dynamic heterogeneous panel data model as in Pesaran
and Smith (1995) that lets the data freely determine the degree of heterogeneity.
Modelling a disequilibrium econometric approach with panel data analysis is chal-
lenging and this is the next stage of my research. I want to study the determinants
of capital flows in Emerging Economies (EMEs) using a disequilibrium econometric
approach for the demand and supply of capital flows, focusing on the role of UMP
adopted by the Federal Reserve. The hypothesis is that on the supply side of capital,
UMP have exerted an important eﬀect on capital flows during the recent global crisis
and the volume of gross capital inflows is determined by the short side of the market.
Although I am in the first stage of this project, I include the econometric framework




Figure A.1: Direct Financial Exposure of Latin America to the US
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Figure A.2: Direct Financial Exposure of Asia to the US
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Figure A.3: Direct Financial Exposure of Europe to the US
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Figure A.4: Direct Financial Exposure of Africa to the US
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Table B.18: Gross Private Capital Inflows Controlling for Cross-Sectional Depen-








































































Table B.20: Gross Private Capital Inflows with a Time-Varying Financial Exposure

































































C. Disequilibrium Econometric Framework of International Cap-
ital Flows
I use a disequilibrium model approach for a panel of 46 EMEs. I assume that the
volume of capital inflows to EMEs is determined by the short side of the market.
Following Fair and Jaﬀee (1972) and extending the model to panel data, the dise-
quilibrium model can be represented by the following equations:








CFi,t = min(CF si,t, CF
d
i,t)
i = 1, ......, n and t = 1,.......,T
where CF di,t and CF si,t are the demand and supply of capital flows for country i at
any given time t respectively, Xdt and Xst are vectors of explanatory variables that
influence the demand and supply of international capital flows respectively. These
vectors could share common variables but as Felices and Orskaug (2008) explain it
is necessary to have at least one unique variable due to exclusion restrictions. In
addition, the residuals udi,t and usi,t are assumed to be independent and normally
distributed as in Maddala and Nelson (1974). CFi,t is the volume of capital inflows
observed that is determined by the short side of the market.
In the supply function, I include as global push factors the actual unconventional
market interventions by the Fed, the VIX implied volatility, and the EMBI Index
spread over the US risk free rate as a measure of capital cost. In addition, I include
time eﬀects in order to capture the eﬀect of global common factors on capital inflows,
and I consider domestic factors such as credit ratings, stock market index, domestic
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short interest rates and the ratio of reserves to short term debt. In the demand
function, the variables included are generally related to country specific factors. I
consider the consumer price index, the domestic stock market index, the domestic in-
dustrial production, the ratio of reserves to imports, the domestic short term interest
rate and the cost of capital as in the supply function.
If there is excess supply of capital flows to EMEs (i.e CF di,t < CF si,t), then the
observed volume of capital inflows is on the demand function. In addition, if there is
excess demand of capital flows to EMEs (i.e CF di,t > CF si,t), there is an international
capital crunch and the observed volume of capital inflows is on the supply function.
Fair and Jaﬀe (1972) examines the pattern of prices to sort out the data into two
groups, one where is excess supply and another where is excess demand. For instance,
increasing prices imply excess demand which suggest that the short side of the market
is the supply, while decreasing prices imply excess supply and the demand determines
the quantity observed.
In the context of capital flows, Mody and Taylor (2002) state that it is not straight-
forward to determine if there is excess demand or excess supply in capital flows
studying the pattern of interest rates as they could be unresponsive to changes in
supply and demand due to asymmetric information. Given this argument, this ap-
proach follows Kiefer (1980) and Maddala (1983) to estimate a disequilibrium model
assuming unknown sample separation (i.e. the demand and supply of capital flows
are not observed) and using all the sample information contained in the data of
capital flows. With this model, it is possible to estimate the probability of observed
capital flows being in the demand or the supply function.
The probability that any given observation CFit belongs to the supply schedule is
given by
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⇡t = Pr(CF si,t < CF
d
i,t)
= Pr(usi,t   udi,t <  0Xdt    0Xst )
This probability is known as the probability of an international capital crunch. I
assume that udi,t and usi,t are independent and normally distributed andf(udi,t, usi,t) is
their joint density function. In addition, I let g(CF di,t, CF si,t) be the joint density
function of CF di,t and CF si,t derived from f(udi,t, usi,t). If an observation of capital
flows at time t is on the supply function, then CF si,t = CFi,t and CF di,t > CFi,t. The
conditional density is
h(CFi,t|CFi,t = CF si,t) =
´1
CFi,t
g(CF di,t, CFi,t) dCF
d
i,t/⇡t
If an observation of capital flows at time t is on the demand function, then CF di,t =
CFi,t and CF si,t > CFi,t. The conditional density is
h(CFi,t|CFi,t = CF di,t) =
´1
CFi,t
g(CF i,t, CF si,t) dCF
s
i,t/(1  ⇡t)
The unconditional density function of CFi,t is given by









g(CF i,t, CF si,t) dCF
s
i,t





Kiefer (1980) explains that ⇡t is not accurate because does not include all the infor-
mation on the sample. Taking this consideration, I follow Kiefer (1980) and Maddala
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(1983) to calculate the probability of a capital crunch. Then, the probability that
any given observation CFi,t belongs to the supply schedule given the observed volume
of capital inflows at time t is given by









g(CF di,t, CFi,t) dCF
d
i,t/h(CFi,t)
Given that udi,t and usi,t are independent, g(CF di,t, CF si,t) can be expressed as the
product of the standard normal density functions g1(CF di,t) · g2(CF si,t) and the cor-
responding distribution functions are given by G1 and G2. Hence, the likelihood






(CFi,t    0Xdt )/ d
⇤
[1 G1 [(CFi,t    0Xst )/ s]]




(CFi,t    0Xdt )/ d
⇤⇤
]
Then, the probability ✓t can be expressed as
✓t =
(1/ s) g2[(CFi,t  0Xst )/ s][1 G2[(CFi,t  0Xdt )/ d]]
(1/ d) g1[(CFi,t  0Xdt )/ d][1 G1[(CFi,t  0Xst )/ s]]+(1/ s) g2[(CFi,t  0Xst )/ s][1 G2[(CFi,t  0Xdt )/ d]]
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